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I. INTRODUCTION
For many in the West, the term shari’a conjures images of brutal punishments
such as cutting off the hands of thieves or stoning adulterers to death.1 Others
associate the term with the subjugation of women and a set of misogynistic rules
governing status and power within family relationships.2 For the ever-growing
*
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1
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE:
IMMIGRATION, ISLAM, AND THE WEST 220 (2009) (“For Europeans, shari’a is a frightening
tabloid specter: lopping off people’s hands for theft, as occurs in Saudi Arabia; [and]
stoning adulteresses to death, as has been the practice in Iran since the Khomeini revolution
of 1979.”).
2
Zainah Anwar & Jana S. Rumminger, Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws:
Challenges, Possibilities, and Strategies for Reform, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529,
1536–37 (2007) (“Such codification, however, was generally based on the classical fiqh
conception of the marriage contract developed by Muslim jurists in the ninth and tenth
centuries in a socio-historical context in which gender inequality and the subjugation of
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Muslim minorities in Western countries, however, shari’a is a term with very
different connotations. For them it gestures towards living a pious life devoted to
realizing God’s justice in the world. According to many pious Muslims in the
West, being a good Muslim is synonymous with living, in so far as possible, in
accordance with God’s law, or in other words, the shari’a.3 The intersection
between this religious impulse and secular legal systems has proven to be
politically charged on more than one occasion.
For example, in 2003, a group called the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice
announced that it would seek to apply shari’a law under the Canadian province of
Ontario’s Arbitration Act, which had earlier been amended to allow for binding,
faith-based arbitration.4 The result was a firestorm of protests. A dozen separate
demonstrations were held across Canada and Europe.5 Caroline Di Cocco, head of
the Ontario Liberal Women’s Caucus, led a unanimous group of female provincial
members of parliament in calling for a ban on shari’a-based arbitration.6 “Some of
the aspects of shari’a law put women on an unequal footing in being able to defend
themselves,”7 Di Cocco said. “We don’t want any of that to be part and parcel of
Ontario law because Ontario law is about equality.”8 Ultimately, the provincial
government amended the Act to eliminate all faith-based arbitration rather than
allow shari’a-based arbitration.9
women were taken for granted. Therefore, modern Muslim family laws are grounded in
assumptions that are centuries old and have little bearing on today’s realities.”).
3
For instance, this accounts for the popularity of English-language websites in which
Muslims may submit questions to religious jurists and receive back a fatwa—legal
opinion—on how to conform their conduct to Islamic law. See, e.g., Living Shari’ah
Compliant, LIVING MUSLIM, http://www.livingmuslim.com/living-shariah-compliant/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011).
4
See Clifford Krauss, When the Koran Speaks, Will Canadian Law Bend?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at A4. In 1991, Ontario amended its Arbitration Act to allow
faith-based arbitration. See id; see also BOYD, infra note 9, at 10–12. At the time, this was
done primarily to accommodate the province’s Orthodox Jewish community, whose
members had been turning to beit din—Jewish religious courts—to resolve disputes
according to the principles of Jewish law. As amended, the Arbitration Act provided that if
the parties consented, religious courts were allowed to issue binding arbitration decisions,
subject to appellate review by the province’s secular courts; See Arbitration Act, S.O.
1991, c. 17 (Can.).
5
See Karen Howlett, Female MPPs Spearheaded Ban on Sharia; Unanimous
Opposition by Women’s Caucus Played Key Role in McGuinty’s Decision, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Sept. 14, 2005, at A8.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Initially, provincial premier Dalton McGuinty commissioned Marion Boyd, a
prominent female lawyer and former provincial attorney general, to conduct a study of the
issue. When Boyd’s report concluded that the safeguards in the present law were sufficient
and suggested that Muslims should enjoy the same access to voluntary arbitration panels as
other religious Canadians, McGuinty’s government repealed the 1991 amendments to the
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Likewise, in February 2008, Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury and
nominal leader of the world’s Anglicans, gave a lecture at the Royal Courts of
Justice in London in which he called for “crafting a just and constructive
relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom.”10
He later told the BBC that in some limited situations, the British courts should
apply shari’a law when called upon to do so by the parties to litigation.11 The result
was a tidal wave of public outrage against England’s high prelate.12 In response,
Williams issued a “clarification,” insisting that he was not calling for the wholesale
application of shari’a to British Muslims.13
The United States has yet to experience a cause célèbre on quite the scale of
the explosions over the Ontario Arbitration Act or Williams’s remarks. In the 2010
elections, however, shari’a law did emerge as a minor issue, with Oklahoma
adopting a state referendum banning the use of Islamic law in the state’s courts.14
In part, the lower saliency of shari’a law as a political issue in the United States
may be because America’s Muslim population is proportionately smaller than the
Muslim population of either Britain or Ontario.15 In addition, the United States is a
Arbitration Act rather than allow shari’a courts to function. See MARION BOYD, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 3–6, 133
(2004), available at http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/
fullreport.pdf; Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Can.).
10
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop’s Lecture—Civil and
Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective at the Royal Courts of Justice
(London) (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.
11
Interview by Christopher Landau, BBC World, with Rowan Williams, Archbishop
of Canterbury (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1573
(“That is why there is a place for finding what would be a constructive accommodation
with some aspects of Muslim law as we already do with some kinds of aspects of other
religious law.”).
12
See John F. Burns, Top Anglicans Rally to Besieged Archbishop, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2008, at A11. A columnist in the Daily Mail captured the responses of many Britons,
writing:
How on earth would human rights law help protect a British Muslim
woman who is exposed to manifold injustice, violence and even “honour
killings” under sharia family law Dr. Williams wishes to entrench? . . . Dr.
Williams’s prescriptions would spell the end of British identity. Until now, all
minorities have set up their own communities of faith and culture under the law
of the land, which binds us all as equally loyal citizens of this country.
Melanie Phillips, Seven Deadly Reasons Why the Archbishop Must Not Be Allowed to Get
Away with It, DAILY MAIL (UK), Feb. 13, 2008, at 14.
13
See Burns, supra note 12.
14
See Nathan B. Oman, Sharia Law Poses No Threat to American Courts, DESERET
NEWS, Dec. 19, 2010, at G06 (discussing the politics behind the Oklahoma referendum).
15
See The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook (follow “Select a Country or Location” drop-down
menu; then select both “Canada” and “United States”) (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (listing, as

290

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

less secular society than either Canada or the United Kingdom, and therefore
Americans may feel less threatened by highly religious minorities.16 That said,
American courts increasingly must grapple with how to treat shari’a law.17 The
overwhelming majority of cases come before American courts not as arbitral
decisions—the issue that sparked controversy in Canada and Britain—but rather as
contract disputes. In particular, when Muslim couples divorce in the United States,
they are increasingly invoking their rights under Islamic marriage agreements,
forcing American courts to grapple with contracts whose meaning is given by
Islamic law.18
Understanding the shari’a contract cases American courts have grappled with
requires first an understanding of the place of law in Muslim thought and practice.
Islam is a juristic religion. In contrast to Christianity, which places faith at the
center of piety, Islam—like Judaism, the other great monotheistic tradition—is an
othropraxic religion in which right conduct (conduct according to God’s law) plays
at least as vital a role as orthodoxy.19 For the devout Muslim, shari’a is more than
simply a set of religious rules or traditions. It represents the primal mode of rightly
relating to God. Accordingly, Islam invests enormous intellectual, emotional, and
spiritual energy in religious law.
a percentage of population, the Muslim demographic of Canada as 1.9% and of the United
States as 0.6%).
16
See Steve Crabtree, Analyst Insights: Religiosity Around the World, GALLUP.COM
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/video/114694/analyst-insights-religiosity-aroundworld.aspx (noting that among developed countries, the United States has by far the highest
level of religiosity).
17
This is not to suggest, of course, that the appearance of shari’a law in American
courts has failed to spark any controversy. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, After Attacks,
Supporters Rally around Choice for Top Administration Legal Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2009, at A19 (“Mr. Koh had made a ‘favorable reference’ to Shariah, or Islamic law, and
had said it could be used to ‘govern a controversy’ in an American court.”).
18
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865–66 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001); In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 871–72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Akileh
v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d
489, 494 (Md. 2008); Aleem v. Aleem, 931 A.2d 1123, 1126, 1129 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2007); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1003, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978);
Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); Habibi-Fahnrich
v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jul. 10, 1995); Aziz v.
Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 123–24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 10, 2008); Mir v. Birjandi, No. 2006 CA
63, 2007 WL 4170868, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007); Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L-001391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190,
193 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
19
See JACOB NEUSNER & TAMARA SONN, COMPARING RELIGIONS THROUGH LAW:
JUDAISM AND ISLAM 5 (1999) (“But Judaism and Islam in one important way stand closer
together than either does to the third companion in the trilogy of monotheism, Christianity.
That way is their conviction that law embodying public policy as much as theology sets
forth religious truth.”).
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Over the centuries, Muslim jurists have painstakingly constructed a body of
legal interpretations of the Muslim revelation, a corpus iuris known as the fiqh.
Hence, there is a considerable body of Muslim religious law governing marriage
and divorce, and in many Muslim countries the formal municipal law closely
follows the fiqh on matters of marriage and family. In Islam, marriage is a contract
rather than a sacrament.20 Accordingly, when Muslims marry they necessarily
enter into a marriage contract. One of the chief features of this contract is the socalled mahr or sadaqa, a sum of money that the husband agrees to pay to the
wife.21 Generally speaking the mahr is divided between an immediate gift to the
wife and a deferred payment to be made upon divorce or the husband’s death.
Both husbands and wives have invoked mahr contracts, contending that the
agreements entitle them to a more favorable settlement than American divorce law
provides.22 American courts are thus faced with two difficult inquiries. The first
goes to matters of interpretation. What exactly are mahr contracts? What did the
parties in fact agree to? The second goes to matters of enforcement. Having
interpreted the terms of the contract, should it be honored by the court? Are there
reasons of public policy or traditional contractual defenses that bar enforcement?
Both inquiries require that courts make sense of contracts embedded in a legal and
cultural context that most American judges find foreign and bewildering.
In at least one case, an American court has reached an extremely harsh result
in interpreting and enforcing a mahr contract.23 The fear of repeating such a result
has led some commentators to argue in favor of a blanket prohibition on the
enforcement of mahr contracts. Others have argued that the adjudication of such
contracts should be removed entirely from the ordinary courts to private, religious
arbiters. This Article takes a middle ground, arguing that courts should be careful
to properly understand the meaning of such contracts on their own terms, but that
current doctrines provide sufficient tools to police overreaching or unduly harsh
results.
At the heart of the courts’ difficulties with mahr contracts lies a failure of
cultural and religious understanding. In particular, American law tends to
understand both marriage and the concept of religion through a set of categories
inherited from a particular religious tradition: Christianity. This is true despite the
fact that the United States is a nominally secular republic, and despite the modern
revolution in the conceptualization of family law. This Christian legacy reveals
itself in our law’s special concern with matters of religious belief, and the tripartite
structure of the act of marriage as consisting of bride, groom, and an officiator
20

See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
The mahr is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a “bride price” or “dowery.”
Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and
the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 589–91 (2010). It is
important to understand, however, that it is not a sum of money paid by the husband to the
wife’s family or vice-versa. Id. It is a payment from husband to wife. Id.
22
See infra Part III.
23
See Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1007–08 (affirming the denial of alimony and equitable
distribution because divorce had already been litigated and decided in Pakistan courts).
21
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performing the marriage.24 Both of these assumptions are foreign to Islam, where
religion centers around law rather than theology, and where the act of marriage is
conceptualized as a contract rather than the tripartite structure bequeathed to the
law from the Christian sacrament of marriage.25 These differences are key to
understanding the meaning that parties ascribe to mahr contracts, and that meaning
in turn is vital to the law’s treatment of these agreements.
This Article thus has two goals. The first is to show how the Muslim
conception of marriage diverges from the Christian-influenced norms that
dominate American law and society. Understanding this divergence provides a
necessary background to Islamic mahr contracts. The second goal is to provide
lawyers and judges with a doctrinal framework within our current law for
analyzing these contracts and reaching sensible results in concrete cases.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part II provides an
introduction to Islamic law in general, and the law of marriage and divorce in
particular, as well as some discussion of how these rules function in practice. Part
III summarizes the way in which American courts have dealt with mahr contracts,
showing how both husbands and wives seek to deploy arguments based on contract
law, the law of premarital agreements, and constitutional law. Part IV provides a
framework for analyzing mahr contracts. It argues that such contracts are best dealt
with using traditional contract doctrines. Indeed, once the meaning of mahr
contracts are properly understood, this Article argues that the common law of
contracts is capable of dealing with potential problems presented by mahr contracts
without any dramatic legal innovations.
II. ISLAM, SHARI’A, AND MARRIAGE CONTRACTS
For a pious Muslim, marriage contracts are bargained for in the shadow of
God’s law, the shari’a. Islamic law both explains the motivation for entering such
contracts and provides the terms and concepts used. Understanding such contracts
requires an understanding of the role of law in Islam, the content of the Islamic law
of marriage and divorce, and the complex social reality of Muslim marriages.
A. The Role of Law in Islam
Consciously or unconsciously, thinking about religion in American law
proceeds from an analogy to Christianity. Stated in the bluntest terms, the core idea
of religion is defined in terms of mainline Protestantism and, to a lesser extent,
Catholicism. Other religious traditions are then understood in terms of analogies to
this core. Hence, for example, Jewish rabbis are implicitly understood as being a
kind of “Jewish version” of a minister.26 Likewise, a Muslim mosque or a Mormon
24

See infra notes 75–81.
See infra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
26
See Wingo v. Comm’r, 89 T.C. 922, 932 (1987) (using a three-prong ministerial
test to determine whether a rabbi fell within the category of minister for tax purposes).
25
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temple is thought of as being “like” a Protestant church.27 We talk of the problem
of “church and state” rather than “mosque and state” or “synagogue and state.”28
We have a “ministerial” or “priest-penitent” privilege, rather than an “iman” or
“rabbinical” privilege.29 And so on. Of course, the task of conceptualizing religion
in general, untainted by any implicit analogies, presents formidable intellectual
problems of its own and may well be impossible.30 Professor George Satayana, for
example, suggested that “the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in
particular” is as hopeless as “[t]he attempt to speak without any particular
language.”31 Given the history of the United States, the persistence of the

27

See Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 294–95 (5th. Cir.
1988) (referring to a mosque as a “church” under a city zoning requirement); see also
CYRIL GLASSE, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 361–63 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing
mosques in Islam, noting their contrast to “a Gothic Christian cathedral”); Immo Luschin,
Temples: Latter-Day Saint Temple Worship and Activity, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MORMONISM 1447, 1449 (Daniel H. Ludlow ed., 1992) (“After being dedicated, LDS
temples are not open to the public but are restricted to Latter-day Saints. Even among
themselves, Latter-day Saints do not talk about the details of the temple ceremony outside
the Temple, because they are sacred.”).
28
See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167
(4th Cir. 1985) (discussing “the ‘wall of separation’ between church and state” (quoting
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947))); C.F. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist.,
615 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has held that the
separation of church and state mandated by the First Amendment ‘rests upon the premise
that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere . . . . [T]he First Amendment ha[s] erected a
wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948))); Connor v.
Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1091 (Pa. 2009) (citing the “underpinnings” of the
“more general doctrine of separation of church and state”).
29
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priest-penitent
privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and
absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return.”); Atwood v. Schriro, 489 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1027 (D.
Ariz. 2007) (stating that the “priest penitent privilege” means that “a ‘clergyman or priest’
shall not be examined ‘as to any confession made to the clergyman or priest in his
professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the
clergyman or priest belongs’ without consent of the person making the confession”)
(quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4062(3) (West 1978 & Supp. 1984)); Commonwealth v.
Kebreau, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1158 (Mass. 2009) (stating the “priest-penitent privilege” may
not be invoked if the statements “were not ‘motivated by a religious or spiritual purpose’”
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (2009))).
30
See, e.g., Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS
FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269, 269 (Mark C. Taylor ed., 1998) (discussing the immense
difficulties that scholars of religion have faced in defining “religion”).
31
GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANTAYANA 141–42 (Irwin Edman ed.,
1953).
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subliminal Christian analogy is understandable and perhaps unavoidable.32 It can,
however, have a distorting effect on thinking about Islam.
In the Gospel of John in the New Testament, Jesus teaches, “Truly, truly, I
say to you, he who believes has eternal life.”33 The saying captures one of the
distinctive features of Christian spirituality: its enormous emphasis on the
centrality of belief. This is not to claim, of course, that other religious traditions are
unconcerned with belief. In Islam, for example, one becomes a Muslim through the
recitation of a statement of belief, the shahada.34 Nevertheless, in Christianity,
faith is not only a virtue and wellspring of religious motivation, but a central aspect
of salvation.35 This emphasis, for example, accounts for the intellectual
development of Christianity, where theology—rational explication of right belief
(orthodoxy)—has always occupied pride of place.36 Not surprisingly, the American
law of religion has been unusually sensitive to matters of belief and theology. For
example, in its earliest foray into the construction of the Free Exercise Clause, the
United States Supreme Court went so far as to define freedom of religion entirely
in terms of freedom of belief.37 Likewise, the Court has taken pains to insist that

32

See, e.g., JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FAITH: CHRISTIANIZING THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 1–6 (1990) (discussing the central place of Christianity in American religious
history).
33
John 6:47 (Revised Standard Version).
34
Shahada means “to testify” or “to bear witness.” SACHIKO MURATA & WILLIAM C.
CHITTICK, THE VISION OF ISLAM 10 (1994). The shahada is: “There is no God but Allah;
Muhammad is His Prophet.” Id. at 45; cf. THE MEANING OF THE HOLY QUR’AN 392
(Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans. 2004) (“Say: He is Allah, the One and Only; Allah, the Eternal,
Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And there is none like unto Him.” (citations
omitted)).
35
See SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 69 (Anna S. Benjamin &
L.H. Hackstaff trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1993) (395) (“But since we cannot pick ourselves
up voluntarily as we fell voluntarily, let us hold with confident faith the right hand of
God—that is, our Lord Jesus Christ—which has been held out to us from on high.”);
MARTIN LUTHER, ON CHRISTIAN LIBERTY 7 (Harold J. Grimm ed., W.A. Lambert trans.,
Fortress Press 2003) (1520) (“Faith alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of
God.”).
36
See Avihu Zakai, The Rise of Modern Science and the Decline of Theology as the
‘Queen of Sciences’ in the Early Modern Era, 9 REFORMATION & RENAISSANCE REV. 125,
126 (2007).
37
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (“Laws are made for
the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil
government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? . . . To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could
exist only in name under such circumstances.”).
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the Constitution’s prohibition on the establishment of religion precludes the
government from adjudicating theological claims.38
Among the three great monotheisms, however, Christianity is notable for its
emphasis on faith and theology. In contrast, both Islam and Judaism emphasize
orthopraxis rather than orthodoxy.39 To be a Christian is in large part about holding
a particular set of beliefs about God, Jesus Christ, and salvation.40 In contrast,
Judaism and Islam place a greater emphasis on pious conduct. The difference can
be seen in the way that medieval Christianity received Islamic thought. During the
thirteenth century, Europe experienced an intellectual flowering that culminated in
the philosophical synthesis of Aristotelian thought and Christian theology in the
work of Thomas Aquinas.41 A key spur to this development was the Latin
translation of earlier Arabic translations of ancient Greek philosophical texts, along

38

See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871) (stating unequivocally that the
Court has no jurisdiction over a matter which is “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its
character . . . a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard
of morals required of them”).
39
See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 4 (1997) (“Muslims
who dissented from the majority on issues of leadership or theology were usually tolerated
provided their social behaviour conformed to generally accepted standards. It is in
enforcing behavioural conformity (orthopraxy) rather than doctrinal conformity
(orthodoxy) that Muslim radicals or activists look to a ‘restoration’ of Islamic law backed
by the power of the state.”); Samuel Belkin, A Democratic Theocracy, in THE JUDAIC
TRADITION 580, 580–83 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1969) (“Many attempts have been made to
formulate a coherent and systematic approach to Jewish theology. All such attempts,
however, have proved unsuccessful, for Judaism was never overly concerned with logical
doctrines. It desired, rather, to evolve a corpus of practices, a code of religious acts, which
would establish a mode of religious living. . . . In Judaism, articles of faith and religious
theories cannot be divorced from particular practices. . . . The . . . theology[] of Judaism is
contained largely in the Halakhah [Jewish law]—in the Jewish judicial system—which
concerns itself not with theory but primarily with practice.”).
40
For example, the Nicene Creed, one of the earliest documents seeking to define
orthodox Christianity does so in terms of belief:
We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of
all that is, seen and unseen. We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of
God eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God
from true God, begotten, not made, one in Being with the Father. Through him
all things were made.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 56 (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
41
See RENAISSANCE AND RENEWAL IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY, at xxv (Robert L.
Benson & Giles Constable eds., 1982) (“[W]hat marked the twelfth-century renaissance
most distinctively was the consciousness of its position in history, its sense of time and of
times, of change and innovation.”).
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with Muslim commentaries on the Greek works.42 The infusion of ideas was not
simply Greek, but also Islamic. For example, the Arab thinkers Ibn Rushd and alGhazali, under the Latinized names of Averroes and Algazel, became important
influences on scholastic debates over the relationship between faith and reason.43
To Christian thinkers, these authors were of interest purely as philosophers and
theologians, that is, as theorists of belief.44 Within Islam, however, their reputation
is different. While their philosophical acumen is acknowledged, their
accomplishments as jurists of Islamic law bulks far greater than any work they did
in the relative intellectual backwater of theology.45 The legal works of both men
continue to be standard references for millions of ordinary Muslims today, while
their theological writings are of interest mainly to a much smaller group of
professional intellectuals.46
The prominence of both men illustrates the extent to which Islamic spirituality
is not simply orthopraxic, but also juristic. The notion of right behavior is
formulated as a legal concept, the shari’a. Westerners usually translate the word
shari’a as “Islamic law,” but this in some ways obscures the meaning of the term.
The word literally means “a path to water,” and though it sometimes refers to the
detailed rules of Islamic jurisprudence, there is actually a separate word in
Arabic—fiqh—for this corpus.47 Rather, for a Muslim the word has connotations
much closer to those that the term “gospel” has for a devout Christian or “Torah”
has for an orthodox Jew. Beyond any detailed system of belief or practice, it refers
to the primal way in which humans should relate themselves to God. Working out
the operational details of the shari’a is the task not of theology, but of the usul alfiqh, Islamic legal theory.48

42

See id. at xxii (noting the “important influence of non-Latin cultural traditions on
particular developments—of the Arabic translations”).
43
See 2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 186–200 (Edmund F.
Sutcliffe ed., 1950) (discussing the influence of the Islamic philosophers, particularly
Algazel and Averroes, on medieval Christendom).
44
See id. at 186 (noting that the interpretation of Aristotle “was incompatible with the
Christian theology and faith”).
45
See FRANK GRIFFEL, AL-GHAZĀLĪ’S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 31–36 (2009)
(describing Al-Ghazali’s rise as a famous jurist); DOMINIQUE URVOY, IBN RUSHD
(AVERROES) 30 (Olivia Stewart trans., Routledge 1991) (noting that Ibn Rushd is a
“recognized specialist in the field of juridical methodology and the study of the various
legal solutions put forward by the major schools of Law (Ikhtilaf)”).
46
See 1 IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER, at xxix (Imran Ahsan
Khan Nyazee trans., 1994) (noting that “Ibn Ruchd’s works on philosophy are well
known”).
47
See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 n.1 (1964)
(distinguishing between “sharī‘a, shar‘, the sacred Law” and “fikh, the science of the
sharī‘a”).
48
Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, in
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW: FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY 1, 14 (Hisham M.
Ramadan ed., 2006) (describing usul al-fiqh).
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Islam rests on the revelation of God to the prophet Mohammed. The core of
that revelation is the Quran (or Qur’an). According to the traditional account, in
610 C.E., Mohammed, a merchant in the Hejaz city of Mecca, received a divine
command to “recite.”49 This resulted in a series of sacred texts, often in verse or
rhyming prose, that were later collected as the “Qur’an.”50 The Quran is not really
a Muslim Bible.51 The Bible is a collection of disparate texts, all of which claim to
have human authors, although the authors are regarded as divinely inspired in
some way.52 In contrast, pious Muslims regard the Quran as having been dictated
word for word in classical Arabic to Mohammed. The Prophet is in no way
regarded as the book’s author. Indeed, during the classical period Muslim
intellectuals debated whether, strictly speaking, the Quran itself had ever been
created or was rather an eternal and unchanging emanation from the mind of
God.53 In Christianity, the closest analogy to the Quran is not the Bible, but Jesus
Christ, whom the Gospel of John declares to be the Word that “was in the
beginning with God.”54 As a practical matter, however, the text of the Quran was
given to Mohammed over a twenty-year period, often in response to the particular
situation in which the Prophet and the early Muslim community found
themselves.55 After the journey—hijrah—from Mecca to the neighboring city of
Yathrib (renamed Medina), Mohammed became not only a spiritual but also a
political leader.56 The Quran thus contains many passages—suras—from this

49

See DANIEL C. PETERSON, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET OF GOD 51 (2007).
See id.
51
See Gary Miller, The Difference Between the Bible and the Quran, QUR’ANIC
STUDIES (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.quranicstudies.com/pdf/articles/the-quran-and-thebible/the-difference-between-the-bible-and-the-quran.pdf (describing the fundamental
differences between the Quran and the Bible). But see PETERSON, supra note 49, at 54
(making the comparison that “[a]s with Jesus, the earliest writing of the teachings of the
Prophet of Islam came from his followers and disciples”).
52
See THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 1024 (Raymond E. Brown et al.
eds., 1990) (“Those divinely revealed realities which are contained and presented in sacred
Scripture have been committed to writing under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. . . . In
composing the sacred books, God chose men and while employed by him they made use of
their powers and abilities, so with him acting in them and through them, they, as true
authors, consigned to writing everything and only those things which He wanted.”).
53
See HENRY CORBIN, HISTORY OF ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY 108–09 (Liadain Sherrard
trans., 1993) (discussing the Mu’tazilite controversy over the nature of the Quran). During
the ninth century this controversy took on political overtones, with successive caliphs
suppressing first one position and then the other. Id. at 10.
54
John 1:2 (Revised Standard Version).
55
See generally PETERSON, supra note 49 (describing the life of Muhammad,
including the beginning of revelations around age forty and their cessation with his death
around age sixty-one).
56
See id. at 91 (“Muhammad became a prophet-statesman, the founder of a political
order and eventually of an empire that would change the history of the world.”).
50
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period instructing the Prophet on the proper organization of the community.57
These texts form the core of Islamic law.
The shari’a is also revealed in the life of the Prophet himself. In the
generations after his death, Muslims began looking to the example—Sunna—of
Mohammed to determine how a pious follower of Islam should live.58 Stories,
known as hadith, regarding the Prophet’s life circulated. Islamic thinkers realized,
of course, that many of the circulating hadith were false, and they began trying to
trace the provenance—isnad—of each story, in order to sort out authentic from
inauthentic hadith.59 The Sunna of Mohammed does not have the same authority as
the Quran.60 Mohammed was merely a messenger of God. Unlike Jesus, for
example, his followers never imputed to him divine status.61 Nevertheless, as a
great prophet, leader, and pious Muslim, Mohammed’s actions command
enormous respect.
Christianity has always acknowledged some sort of existential divide between
God and Caesar.62 Even so-called Ceasoropapism, for example, distinguished
between the two swords—the spiritual and the temporal.63 Jesus was never a
political leader.64 In contrast, Mohammed was the governor of Yathrib and the
Quran assumes that part of his mission was to establish a just political order based
57

See id. at 93 (“The ideal Islamic paradigm, however, is Muhammad, who ruled a
state for nearly half his prophetic ministry and received numerous revelations instructing
him how to do it.”).
58
See SCHACHT, supra note 47, at 17–18 (describing the rise of the idea of “sunna of
the Prophet” as a theological as well as political theory).
59
See Kimberly Yonce Schooley, Comment, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human
Rights—Toward a Communitarian Vision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 663 n.62 (1994)
(describing how the reliability of hadith is judged by examining whether the “chain of
narrators (isnad) is consistent and continuous” as traced back to Mohammed); cf.
SCHACHT, supra note 47, at 34–36 (describing how various false hadith, supported by
fabricated isnad, were circulated among practitioners of Islam, and that “[h]ardly any of
these traditions . . . can be considered authentic”).
60
See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 48, at 13 (“[T]he Prophet establishes in Islam the
supremacy of the Qu’ran and then his Sunnah.”)
61
See id. at 8 (“[P]romulgation of the concept of man as God, or woman as God, or
the incarnation of God through a created thing, whether material or spiritual, is an
anathema in Islam.”)
62
See Luke 20:20–26 (King James) (“And he said unto them, Render therefore unto
Caesar the things which be Caesar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s.”).
63
See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 88 (1983) (describing Caesaropapism as distinguishing
between political leaders and priests, or spiritual leaders, while noting that in the eleventh
century kings and emperors were considered to be “deputies of Christ” and spiritual leaders
of their subjects).
64
But see generally JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, THE HISTORICAL JESUS: THE LIFE OF A
MEDITERRANEAN JEWISH PEASANT (1992) (arguing that Jesus should be seen as the leader
of a political protest movement); JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY
BIOGRAPHY (1994) (same).
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on God’s revelations.65 Hence, law and politics are existentially intertwined with
religion in Islam in a way that they are not in Christianity.
During the classical period of Islamic history, a class of legal intellectuals—
the uluma—began painstakingly interpreting the Quran and the Sunna of the
Prophet in order to construct a set of rules for an Islamic society.66 They were
aided by two additional sources: The first was a process of analogical reasoning
from the Quran or the Sunna known as qiyas.67 The second was an appeal to the
consensus of Muslim belief and practice, on the theory that it was unlikely that any
rule commanding universal assent would be mistaken.68 This is known as ijma’.69
Together these four sources of law—Quran, Sunna, qiyas, and ijma’—form the
usul al-fiqh, the foundations of Islamic law.70 Through a process of rigorous
analysis and hermeneutic struggle known as ijtihad, the jurists produced a body of
detailed rules—the fiqh—which came to define a pious Muslim life.71
To be sure, it is possible to overemphasize the juristic tradition in Islam to the
exclusion of other important elements of Muslim spirituality, for example, the
mystical tradition of Sufism.72 Some contemporary Muslims have argued that the
juristic element within Islam can be overemphasized to the detriment of its more
ethical core.73 Nevertheless, it is important to understand that for many Muslims,
living a pious Islamic life is defined less in terms of holding particular beliefs than
in terms of following, in so far as one can, the demands of correctly reasoned fiqh.
Islamic law is therefore not the system of rules that happened to evolve within
Islamic societies. It is not even analogical to the cannon law that governs the

65

See generally PETERSON, supra note 49, at 90–98 (discussing Mohammed’s time as
the leader of the Islamic community in Yathrib).
66
See generally 1 MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE
AND HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION (1974) (discussing the rise of the classical schools
of Islamic jurisprudence).
67
See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 48, at 5–6.
68
See id.
69
See id.
70
See id. at 5–6, 14.
71
See generally BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 88–112 (1998)
(discussing the role of ijtihad in dealing with uncertainty about the scope of divine law);
Bernard Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, 26 AM. J. COMP. L.
199 (1978) (describing the methods of Islamic legal interpretation); see also Frank Vogel,
The Closing of the Door of Ijtihad and the Application of the Law, 3 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC.
SCI. 396 (1993) (discussing the decline of independent ijtihad and the increasing reliance
on classical legal commentaries in applying the shari’a).
72
See generally CORBIN, supra note 53, at 187–203 (describing Sufism as Islam’s
attempt to live according to the Prophet’s message by purifying one’s inner heart and
turning towards God through asceticism, mysticism, and transcendence); HODGSON, supra
note 66, at 393–409 (discussing the mystical traditions of the Sufis).
73
See generally ALI A. ALLWALI, THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION (2009)
(criticizing contemporary Islamic religious and political thought).
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internal institutional machinery of Christian churches.74 Rather, the shari’a is
central to Islam as a spiritual system in the way that faith is central to a Protestant
Christian, sacraments are central to a Catholic Christian, or Torah is central to a
Jewish believer. With this background, we turn to the classical Islamic law of
marriage.
B. A Brief Introduction to Islamic Marriage Law
The legal concept of marriage under American law is a lineal descendant of
the Christian sacrament of marriage.75 According to the Catholic Catechism, for
example, a sacrament is an “efficacious sign[] of grace, instituted by Christ and
entrusted to the Church,”76 and the sacrament of marriage “signifies the union of
Christ and the Church.”77 On this view, a wedding is more than simply a party
celebrating a new marriage.78 Rather, at its heart it is a ceremony in which one
having priestly authority performs some sacred act that results in a couple
becoming married.79 This same basic structure continues in American law.80 A
couple cannot marry themselves. Rather, they must go to some government
official—or a religious leader exercising specially delegated state power—who
74

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, American and Muslim Perspectives on Freedom of
Religion, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 355, 364 (2006) (stating that Islam has “no ‘Church’ in the
Christian sense of the term”).
75
See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE,
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997) (discussing the religious origins
of the legal concept of marriage).
76
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 40, at 320.
77
Id. at 463.
78
See id. (“[The sacrament of marriage] gives spouses the grace to love each other
with the love with which Christ has loved his Church; the grace of the sacrament thus
perfects the human love of the spouses, strengthens their indissoluble unity, and sanctifies
them on the way to eternal life.”).
79
Within Catholicism, the issue is slightly more complicated. The official Catechism
of the Catholic Church states, “[According to Latin tradition], the spouses, as ministers of
Christ’s grace, mutually confer upon each other the sacrament of Matrimony by expressing
their consent before the Church.” Id. at 405. Since the time of the Protestant Reformation,
however, the Catholic Church has required a public ceremony for the sacrament of
matrimony. See id. at 407 (“The priest (or deacon) who assists at the celebration of a
marriage receives the consent of the spouses in the name of the Church and gives the
blessing of the Church. The presence of the Church’s minister (and also of the witnesses)
visibly expresses the fact that marriage is an ecclesial reality.”). The Lutheran theology of
marriage, perhaps ironically, places less emphasis on the contractual aspect of marriage,
emphasizing the social authority of the marriage officiator and with it the social basis of
marriage. See generally HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 184–85 (2003)
(discussing the effect of the Lutheran reformation on the legal conceptualization of
marriage).
80
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-13 (2008) (directing that every marriage in Virginia
“be under a license and solemnized” according to the dictates of Virginia law).

2011]

HOW TO JUDGE SHARI’A CONTRACTS

301

then performs the act of marrying the couple.81 If a couple makes a contract
regarding their marriage, the most common example being a premarital agreement,
we understand the contract as something quite different from the marriage itself.82
A premarital agreement does not marry a couple in the way that a magistrate
marries a couple. Indeed, a couple need not enter into any contracts at all to
become married, provided that one having the proper legal authority declares the
couple husband and wife.
The Islamic conception of marriage is different because Islam has no concept
of priesthood and it has no sacraments.83 Rather, all believers are to relate to God
immediately and without the mediation of any priestly class.84 Of course, in Islam
the shari’a may command the performance of certain ritual acts, such as the daily
regime of prayer required of a Muslim believer.85 These rituals, however, are not
sacraments in the sense of constituting moments when a divine priestly authority is
exercised.86 The absence of any concept of priesthood or sacrament is key to
understanding marriage under the shari’a.
Under the rules developed in the classical fiqh, marriage is a contract.87 One
does not become married through the performance of any priestly ritual. Rather, a
marriage comes into existence when a man and a woman enter into a contract.88 In
other words, a Muslim marriage contract is not a premarital agreement—that is, an
agreement made in contemplation of a later act that will bring the marriage into
existence. Instead the marriage contract is the marriage. There is no subsequent act
that constitutes a final solemnization that brings the marriage into existence.89 A
81

See, e.g., id. § 20-23 (setting out the requirements for a minister to celebrate
marriages in Virginia); id. § 20-25 (permitting a judge to issue an order authorizing a
person to celebrate the rites of marriage).
82
See Lieberman v. Lieberman, 587 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“[A
premarital] agreement does not become effective until the parties marry.”).
83
JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER
MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 1 (1990) (noting one difference between Islam and
Christianity is the absence of a clerical hierarchy).
84
See HODGSON, supra note 66, at 318 (noting that in Islam “every person, as such,
with no exceptions, was summoned in his own person to obey the commands of God: there
could be no intermediary, no group responsibility, no evasion of any sort from direct
confrontation with the divine will”).
85
See WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI’A: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 227–31
(2009) (outlining the prayer requirement in Islamic law).
86
See id. at 225 (“These performative works are constructionist, in that they are
constituted and created by the believers as devotional acts for the purpose of fulfilling a
covenant with God.”).
87
See id. at 271 (“[M]arriage as nikah [is] a contract with a narrow scope . . . .”).
88
See, e.g., NASIR, supra note 83, at 9–12 (outlining the two forms of guardianship
recognized in shari’a law, one that has a right of compulsion exercised over minors or
others with limited legal capacity and one that does not have this right of compulsion but
instead is chosen in deference to social custom).
89
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 272–73 (discussing the minimum requirements for
an Islamic marriage contract).
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couple need not even be present at the inception of their marriage; it can be formed
through agents, just like any other contract.90 An Islamic marriage contract requires
two capable and eligible parties, at least two witnesses, one guardian, and the
proper form of offer and acceptance.91 In addition a virgin—that is, a woman who
has never been married before—must be represented by a wali, or guardian. The
wali is the bride’s closest male relative, generally a father or uncle. His role is to
negotiate the contract and insure that the bride’s interests are protected.92
The chief object of negotiation is the mahr. The standard Islamic marriage
contract must contain deferred dower, called a mahr or sadaqa.93 Contrary to the
way that it is sometimes discussed in non-Muslim sources, the mahr is not a “bride
price.”94 Rather, it is a sum of money or some other economically valuable asset
that a husband must give to a wife. Upon marriage the wife is entitled to the mahr;
any delay is a matter of contractual forbearance on her part.95 Such delays are
standard, however, and the mahr is almost always divided between a nominal
payment upon marriage with the bulk of the mahr due upon divorce or the
husband’s death.96 The mahr is thus supposed to provide wives with some measure
of financial independence, ensuring that they have some pool of property that is
uniquely their own.97
There are three ways in which a marriage can be dissolved under Islamic law.
The first method is called tafriq.98 This is a judicial proceeding in which a wife
petitions an Islamic judge, known as a qadi, for dissolution of the marriage for
cause.99 The most common reasons are abuse, a husband’s failure to financially
support his wife, or abandonment.100 In addition, according to the dominant
interpretations of the shari’a, a wife has a right to sexual intercourse with her
90

See id. at 274 (“Either of the two contracting parties could be represented by a
person acting on his/her behalf as a legally empowered agent.”).
91
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 3–16 (discussing in detail the requirements of an
Islamic marriage contract); see also HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 271–78 (also describing the
necessary provisions of a marriage contract).
92
See Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts:
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptuals and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 189, 197–98 (2002).
93
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 277 (“The delayed dower was normally stipulated as
protection, becoming due to the wife from the husband if he repudiated her through talaq
or if either of them died.”).
94
See supra note 21.
95
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 48–49 (discussing how dower is treated as part of the
marriage contract).
96
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 277.
97
Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 200–02.
98
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 279–80 (discussing the requirements and function of
tafriq).
99
See id. at 280 (stating that “a judicial order known as tafriq” is literally translated in
Arabic to mean “to separate the spouses from each other”).
100
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 90–95 (outlining the reasons a wife petitions a court
for dissolution of marriage).
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husband at least once every four months.101 As a practical matter, qadis are loath to
dissolve marriages in any case where they think reconciliation between the parties
is possible, and hence in practice, obtaining a tafriq can be difficult for a wife.102
The second method by which a divorce may be dissolved is by khul’.103 This
method does not require any intervention by an Islamic court and occurs as a
matter of agreement between the parties.104 A khul’ can only be obtained if the
other spouse consents.105 If the husband consents to divorce, the law requires that
the wife provide consideration, known as ‘iwad, equal to the amount of mahr. 106
The ‘iwad can be paid in a variety of ways.107 Sometimes it consists of a cash
payment.108 It may also be paid if the wife provides child care for the minor
children of the marriage upon divorce.109 In the eyes of Islamic law, by caring for
the children, the wife provides the husband with a service for which she may
demand compensation.110 Hence, the provision of such care gratis could constitute
a proper ‘iwad.111 The most common method of paying the ‘iwad, however, is for
the wife to forego her claim to a deferred mahr.112 As mentioned previously, while
101

See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 278–79 (noting the requirement of sexual pleasure
as part of Islamic marriages).
102
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 87–90 (detailing tafriq and its application in Islamic
law countries); see also Sylvia Brooks & Felix Hoover, Religions Have Rules for Dealing
with Divorce, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), June 5, 1998, at 1E (describing the Quran’s
preference for reconciliation over divorce); M. Rafique Goraya, Jamaat-I-Islami Demands
Reconstitution of IICP, BUSINESS RECORDER (Pakistan), Feb. 25, 2009 (recommending that
the government not adopt a law requiring a husband to grant a wife’s request for a divorce
because “[t]he Holy Quran advises reconciliation between the spouses”); Ruqaiyyah Waris
Maqsood, Women and Islam, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 15, 2001, 12:00AM GMT),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1399889/Women-and-Islam.html (“In good
Islamic practice, before divorce can be contemplated, all possible efforts should be made to
solve a couple’s problems.”).
103
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 283–86 (discussing the application of khul’).
104
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 78 (“[M]arriage may be dissolved by mutual consent
by the wife giving the husband something for her freedom under the Quranic ruling . . . .”).
105
See id. at 78–81 (providing a general description the requirements of khul’).
106
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 285–86 (discussing the five required elements of a
khul’ contract, including consideration).
107
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 79 (“The consideration for the khula [i.e., khul’] may
be pecuniary, advanced or deferred, or may be the nursing, maintenance, and custody of
their child.”).
108
See supra note 94–95 and accompanying text.
109
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 286 (“The consideration may consist of
. . . a usufruct, including her work/service in suckling their children for a specified
duration . . . .”).
110
See id. at 279 (“As in the case of dower, [a wife] is under no obligation to spend
any of this support or any portion of her own property on others, including her own
children whose needs are, in their entirety, looked after by the father.”).
111
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 286 (noting the amount of consideration required
for khul’ will not exceed the amount of the dower).
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not required by classical fiqh, as a practical matter, most marriage contracts divide
the dower between an initial, often nominal payment, and a delayed payment upon
dissolution of the marriage.113 In most khul’ transactions, the wife simply forgoes
this claim as the price of dissolving the marriage.114
The final method of dissolving a marriage is known as talaq.115 Talaq allows a
husband to unilaterally divorce his wife without cause, judicial proceeding, or her
consent.116 Divorce through talaq can occur in several ways.117 The first way is for
a man to say to his wife “I divorce thee” in three successive months during the
period when his wife is not menstruating.118 Another form of talaq, known as ila’,
is for a man to take an oath that he will abstain from sexual intercourse with his
wife for four successive months.119 If he keeps the oath, then talaq occurs.120 If he
fails to keep the oath, and has sexual intercourse with his wife, then he must
perform penance (the oath being a breach of his marital obligation to provide
sexual access to his wife) and the marriage remains valid.121 Finally, talaq can be
performed by a husband declaring, “I divorce thee” three times in succession.122
Talaq can also be performed by proxy.123 Indeed, a husband may confer the
independent power of talaq through either a revocable (talaq tawkil) or irrevocable
(talaq al-tafwid) power of attorney.124 This power of exercising talaq is sometimes
given to a wife in a marriage contract, in effect giving her the same unilateral right

113

See id. at 277 (discussing the two types of dower present in Islamic marriages).
See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
115
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 280–83 (outlining the requirements and procedure
of talaq).
116
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 70–78 (discussing talaq and noting that many
countries have begun to curb this nearly unlimited power of the husband).
117
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 280–83 (noting the different ways to effect talaq);
see also NASIR, supra note 83, at 73–75 (comparing how talaq is treated in various Islamic
law countries).
118
Under Islamic law, sexual intercourse during menstruation is forbidden. The logic
of the talaq rule is that the husband must demonstrate his seriousness by declaring “I
divorce thee” during successive periods of sexual access. According to the classical fiqh,
an important element of marriage is that both husbands and wives are required to provide
their spouse with sexual access. See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 281–82.
119
See id. at 286 (“Should the period of ila lapse without resumption of sexual
intercourse, the oath will have the force of a final talaq.”).
120
See id.
121
See id. at 286 (“The latter penalty is imposed on the grounds that the husband has
caused his wife undue hardship by depriving her of sexual enjoyment without having
intended or succeeded in effecting the dissolution of the marriage.”).
122
See id. at 281 (This form of talaq “terminates the [marriage] contract once and for
all”).
123
See id. at 282–83 (discussing the delegation of authority to a proxy).
124
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 76–78 (discussing the difference between the two
forms).
114
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of divorce as her husband.125 Some Muslim feminists have argued that such
provisions should be a standard part of marriage contracts on equality grounds.126
The potential for the abusive use of talaq is recognized by Muslim jurists.127
As a practical matter, the delayed mahr is meant to act as a check upon the
husband’s otherwise unfettered power of talaq, requiring that he pay what amounts
to a fine to his wife upon divorce.128 It is important to realize, however, that the
wife’s right to the dower vests upon marriage.129 There is no other act that she
must take in order to become entitled to the mahr under Islamic law.130
Furthermore, she may only be deprived of her immediate right to mahr by her own
consent, either through the voluntary delay of its payment stipulated in the
marriage contract or through a subsequent contract, as in a khul’ divorce.131 Hence,
while the mahr functions as a de facto penalty clause upon the husband’s use of
talaq, strictly speaking, talaq is not a condition precedent to its payment. Rather, it
must be paid upon dissolution of the marriage, however that occurs, unless the
wife otherwise consents.
Under Islamic law, there is no disability on women—married or otherwise—
holding property.132 Indeed, the Prophet Muhammed married an older widow who
held and managed considerable property.133 Following her example, Islamic law
has never included any device equivalent to the common-law doctrine of coverture
125

See id. at 72.
A man may dissolve his marriage by pronouncing that he has dissolved the
marriage, whereas Islamic law limits the ability of a wife to divorce her husband. JOHN L.
ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 30–33 (1982). Female Muslim activists
propose that women also have a contractual right to pronounce divorce by talaq-i-tafwid.
See TALAQ-I-TAFWID: THE MUSLIM WOMAN’S CONTRACTUAL ACCESS TO DIVORCE: AN
INFORMATION KIT (Lucy Carroll & Harsh Kapoor eds., 1996), available at
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/import/english/pubs/pdf/misc/talaq-i-tawfideng.pdf; Michèle Alexandre, Big Love: Is Feminist Polygamy an Oxymoron or a True
Possibility?, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 26 (2007) (suggesting that Islamic polygamists
should grant each wife a right to instigate a unilateral divorce); L. Elizabeth Chamblee,
Rhetoric or Rights?: When Culture and Religion Bar Girls’ Right to Education, 44 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1073, 1112 n.252 (2004).
127
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 282 (“The message the jurists wished to urge upon
men was that they should not resort to talaq unless there is a compelling cause, and even
when such a cause appears to exist, they should proceed with caution.”).
128
Id. at 282 (noting that husbands “stood to lose most from marital dissolution” by
exercising talaq).
129
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 45 (“[T]he dower . . . shall be the right of the wife
once the valid contract is made.”).
130
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
131
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 49–52 (describing how a wife is entitled to the dower
specified in the contract).
132
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 2 (claiming that a Muslim woman enjoys “full
autonomy as far as her property is concerned”).
133
PETERSON, supra note 49, at 44–46 (describing Muhammad’s relationship with his
older widowed wife).
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or other restrictions on married women holding property.134 Accordingly, there is
no equivalent to marital property or community property under the classical
fiqh.135 Property does not belong to the couple as a married community or to the
husband as the sole legal personality of the marriage.136 Rather, any property
brought to the marriage by the wife or acquired during the marriage by her remains
her property.137 Likewise, any property acquired by the husband during the
marriage remains his property.138 Upon divorce, a wife has no claim upon her
husband’s assets under the theory that they constitute marital property.139 The lack
of marital property means that Islamic marriage contracts are not premarital
agreements in the sense of allocating the division of marital property upon divorce.
Under Islamic law there is no such thing as marital property to distribute.140
In cases where the wife is a homemaker, and hence has not earned substantial
income during the marriage, the absence of marital property can work economic
hardship in the event of divorce.141 The classical fiqh seeks to mitigate this in a
couple of ways. First, a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband during
the marriage, and this right to maintenance continues for a period of a few months
after divorce.142 In addition, husbands will sometimes provide their ex-wives with
mutat. This is a sum of money in addition to the mahr provided by the husband. It
“is a matter of custom and goodwill,”143 but the custom is based on a Quranic
passage and is widely encouraged.144 Finally, under Islamic law the concepts of
custody and guardianship are separated.145 While fathers are always made the
guardians of their children, the law presumptively awards custody of minor
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See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 279 (describing the historic property rights given to
Muslim women).
135
See id. at 279 (“Marriage does not create community property.”).
136
See id. (“Any inheritance or gift she may receive before or during the marriage
remains hers exclusively, and so does her dower and all property that accrues to her.”).
137
See id. at 279 (“But the wife, like her husband, maintains an independent financial
status throughout the marriage.”).
138
See id.
139
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140
Id.
141
See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text.
142
See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 182 (1998)
(discussing a wife’s maintenance rights). The period, known as an iddat, extends for threemonths after a revocable divorce. The purpose of the iddat is to “avoid confusion over
paternity in the event that the wife is pregnant” at the time of divorce. Id. at 183.
143
Id. at 184.
144
See Hafiz Nazeem Goolam, Gender Equality in Islamic Family Law: Dispelling
Common Misconceptions and Misunderstandings, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW:
FROM CLASSICAL TO CONTEMPORARY, supra note 48, at 117, 122 (“It is stated in the
Koran: ‘For divorced women maintenance (should be provided) on a reasonable (scale).’”).
145
See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 142, at 410–11 (discussing guardianship and
custody).
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children to mothers.146 While schools of jurisprudence differ on how long the
period of a mother’s custody lasts, they all agree that during that period she is
entitled to child support payments from the father.147 However, the impact of this
rule is limited by the fact that a father is free to transfer custody of his minor
children to another woman—such as an aunt or grandmother—who is willing to
provide child care gratis.148
C. Islamic Marriage in Practice
The rules of fiqh outlined above inform Muslim marriage as a social practice,
but its actual contours are influenced by factors other than the decrees of the
classical jurists. First, the rules can reinforce pre-existing disparities of power
between men and women. For example, a woman’s consent is nominally required
for a valid marriage contract. However, the requirement that marriage contracts by
virgins be made only with the consent of a guardian means that, in practice, the
rules facilitate arranged and sometimes even coerced marriages.149 Likewise, in
practice, qadis can be biased against women in tafriq proceedings, by either the
hope that abusive relationships can be repaired or because they do not regard
certain kinds of abuse as severe enough to warrant divorce.150 As discussed above
the alternative to tafriq for a woman, khul’, necessarily leaves her at her husband’s
mercy, not only because he must consent to a divorce but also because she must
provide an ‘iwad.151 Particularly in the absence of marital property regimes, giving
up a deferred dower may amount to the loss of a woman’s chief economic asset.
The starkest disparity, however, comes in talaq. Despite the moral disapproval
with which its abuse is regarded, talaq is nevertheless guarded as a husband’s
legitimate right. Coupled with the absence of any concept of marital property, it
leaves women in a vulnerable position and gives husbands a potent threat against
their wives.152 The potency of the threat comes not only from the unilateral right of
divorce given to the husband, but also from the fact that formal equality and
146

See NASIR, supra note 83, at 187; PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 142, at 411;
Goolam, supra note 144, at 127.
147
See PEARL & MENSKI, supra note 142, at 430.
148
See NASIR, supra note 83, at 196–97 (discussing a mother’s right to child support
payments).
149
See id. at 49 (“‘Guardianship with the right of compulsion’ (al-wali al-Mujber) is
exercised over a person of no or limited legal capacity, wherein the guardian may conclude
a marriage contract which is valid and takes effect without the consent or acceptance of the
ward.”).
150
YVONNE YAZBECK HADDAD ET AL., MUSLIM WOMEN IN AMERICA: THE
CHALLENGE OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY TODAY 84 (2006) (“Most Muslims . . . consider divorce
a last and most undesirable alternative. The Prophet himself is often quoted as having said
that of all hateful things in the world, divorce is among the worst.”).
151
See HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 286.
152
Id. at 114 (“[W]omen are vulnerable in marriage to the man’s privilege to execute
a ‘talaq’ divorce.”).
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independence of property rights granted to men and women within marriage means
that a wife who does not work outside the home will be left with few economic
resources beyond her deferred dower.153 The husband’s power is further
entrenched by strong social pressure for the wife not to work outside the home, and
the difficulty of remarriage for divorcees in many Muslim cultures.154
The classical fiqh has always been, at some level, the theoretical creation of
religious scholars and intellectuals.155 Even during the classical period it was never
the sole functioning law in Muslim lands.156 Today, with the exception of Saudi
Arabia and a few other Persian Gulf states that are nominally governed solely by
shari’a, it does not function as the municipal law of any jurisdiction.157 It does,
however, inform the enacted family law codes of many Muslim countries.158
Hence, many of the Islamic marriage contracts that come before American courts
are shaped not only by the classical fiqh, but also by the laws of the foreign
jurisdictions in which they were contracted.159 Likewise, among immigrant
communities, perceptions of what constitutes an Islamic marriage are often
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See supra notes 135–139, 141 and accompanying text.
AMINAH BEVERLY MCCLOUD, TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIMS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
70–71 (2006) (stating that “once a female divorces she is no longer eligible for marriage
inside the community,” whereas “[i]f men get divorced there is no stigma” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Azizah Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women’s Rights in the Global
Village: Challenges and Opportunities, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 37, 37–38 (2000–01)
(discussing that “divorce and remarriage have been rendered much easier for men” in
Muslim culture); Kathryn J. Webber, The Economic Future of Afghan Women: The
Interaction Between Islamic Law and Muslim Culture, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1049,
1066 (1997) (“Husbands effectively possess the power to prevent their wives from
working. Under the obedience doctrine, if a woman wants to work and gain access to
economic resources, her husband may turn to the courts for recourse. He can stop
supporting his wife and even physically punish her with little restriction.”).
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Anver M. Emon, Toward a Natural Law Theory in Islamic Law: Muslim Juristic
Debates on Reason as a Source of Obligation, 3 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 1, 2 (2003)
(discussing the theoretical debates among Muslim jurists as to which fiqh “ruling was
‘right’ or could authoritatively be considered ‘God’s law’”).
156
See Asifa Quraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps
Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 343–44
(discussing the different functioning laws in classical Muslim lands).
157
The World Factbook, supra note 15 (follow “Select a Country or Location” dropdown menu, then select the names of the countries in the following parenthetical) (stating
that the legal system of Saudi Arabia is based on shari’a law and that the legal systems of
the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Oman are influenced by Islamic law).
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See Sameer Ahmed, Recent Developments: Pluralism in British Islamic
Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing Islamic Law in the United Kingdom, 33 YALE J.
INT’L L. 491, 492 (2008) (“While many of the twentieth-century postcolonial Muslim states
adopted European criminal and commercial laws, most developed their own family law
codes inspired by Islamic legal rulings.”).
159
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 18.
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influenced by the nominally secular law of their countries of origin.160 For
example, in Pakistan a marriage is contracted by going before a government
official and executing a marriage “license.”161 This license, however, mirrors a
traditional Islamic marriage contract, requiring that the wife’s guardian consent to
the marriage and that the parties name the amount of the deferred dower.162 The
pre-printed forms, however, do not provide for additional provisions in the
marriage contract—such as a talaq al-tafwid giving the wife a right of talaq equal
to that of the husband—despite the fact that such provisions are allowed under the
classical fiqh.163
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the vast majority of cases the
classical fiqh will be only one determinant in how marriages function in practice.
Claiming, as it does, approximately 1.3 billion adherents, Islam necessarily
includes a huge amount of regional and cultural variation.164 A marriage between
Filipino Muslims will necessarily have a different cultural background than one
contracted between Muslims at the opposite side of Eurasia, in the Atlas
Mountains of Morocco.
For example, the practice of honor killings, in which male relatives will
murder female relatives for fornication or even romantic involvement with nonMuslims has understandably garnered public attention.165 Honor killings, however,
are concentrated among particular ethnic and cultural groups stretching from the
Kurdish regions of eastern Anatolia and east into Pakistan and Afghanistan.166
Among women in these regions—and among immigrant women from these
regions who have reason to fear such actions—honor killings clearly create strong
incentives to enter only into culturally approved relationships.167 The practice,
however, is foreign to the vast majority of Muslim communities.
Less spectacularly, arranged marriage is the norm in many Muslim
communities, including some immigrant communities in the United States. Such
marriages are perhaps best thought of on a continuum. At one pole are coerced
marriages in which a man or woman is forced to marry someone against their
will.168 At the other pole are marriages that involve substantial vetting by family
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See Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 492 (Md. 2008) (reproducing a marriage
license issued in Pakistan containing provisions for dower, the consent of the wife’s
guardian, and limits on divorce).
161
Id.
162
Id.
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Id.
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See NASIR, supra note 83, at 211.
165
See CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 217 (discussing cases of honor killings).
166
See id. at 217–18 (discussing the geographic origins of the practice of honor
killings).
167
See id. at 217–19 (discussing honor killings among Muslim immigrants in
Europe).
168
See Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 198.
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members, but ultimately allow the prospective bride or groom to veto an
undesirable match.169
To get some sense of the complexity involved, consider the following case. A
young man might be attracted to a particular young woman. He would inform his
parents or older siblings of this fact. They would then approach the young
woman’s family. A series of closely supervised meetings between the young man
and the young woman would result. The young man and his parents or older
siblings would then collectively decide to propose marriage to the young woman.
She would be approached through her family. A similar collective deliberation
would follow among her family. Provided that the woman accepts the offer and her
family agrees, her parents or older siblings would then negotiate the terms of the
marriage contract with the groom’s family. On the day of the marriage, the
prospective couple would sign the contract.
Variations on this scenario might include parents initiating the contact with a
young woman of their own choosing, followed by the same closely controlled
contact. Likewise, the final decision by a man or woman may be subject to greater
or lesser pressure from family members, or no pressure at all. Indeed, one study in
Houston revealed a wide variety of marital practices within the same families.170
One daughter, for example, might contract a marriage under the close supervision
of her family, following the traditional patterns of proxy arrangements and strong
parental involvement. Her sister, however, might opt for marriage via the kind of
self-directed dating and romance one finds in the wider non-Muslim culture.
In short, the rules of the fiqh are but one force determining how Muslim
marriages unfold, and given the diversity of Muslim communities and practices, it
would be foolish to hazard blanket generalizations about Muslim marriages.
Rather, in assessing how any particular Muslim couple entered their marriage, the
specific facts of the case provide a better guide than stereotypes about a “typical
Muslim marriage.” Despite this diversity, however, the fiqh does create certain
core elements present in most Muslim marriages.
III. ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACTS IN AMERICAN COURTS
In American divorce proceedings between Muslim spouses, both husbands
and wives have invoked their Islamic marriage contracts. Husbands invoke the
contracts as a way of limiting their liability to ex-wives upon divorce. Those
adopting the most aggressive position argue that the contracts are an agreement
that every legal aspect of the couple’s marriage will be governed by Islamic law.
169

See id. at 231.
See Denis Al-Johar, Muslim Marriages in America: Reflecting New Identities,
95 MUSLIM WORLD 557, 562–572 (2005) (discussing arranged marriages in Muslim
communities in Houston, Texas and offering some empirical data); see also Arshia U.
Zaidi & Muhammad Shuraydi, Perceptions of Arranged Marriages by Young Pakistani
Muslim Women Living in a Western Society, 33 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 495 (2002)
(discussing the changing perception of young women toward arranged marriages and the
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Hence, the ordinary rules of American property and family law ought not to apply
to the divorce proceeding. Rather than applying the rules regarding community
property or equitable distribution, a wife’s claim in divorce ought to be limited to
the property to which she held title at the time of marriage, and any property
acquired by her during the course of the marriage. Further, all wealth acquired by
the husband during the marriage should be exempt because of the agreement that
Islamic marriage law ought to apply to the couple’s divorce. This aggressive
reading of the marriage contract has also been invoked as a contractual backstop
for husbands seeking to have a talaq valid under the laws of a Muslim country
recognized by American courts.
A less aggressive claim that husbands put forward is that the marriage
contract constitutes a premarital contract in which the wife agreed to receive the
mahr in lieu of any claims on marital property under American law. While this
reading does not seek to completely displace American family law with Islamic
law in property disputes, it would have the same effect in practice: the wife would
lose any claim on wealth earned by the husband during the marriage.
Wives have also sought to enforce Islamic marriage contracts. All of these
actions take the form of claims for the mahr upon divorce. Wives can make the
claim in two situations. First, wives may try to enforce the mahr provision as an
ordinary debt, in addition to whatever distribution of marital assets they are
entitled to under state divorce law. Second, in cases where the marital assets are
essentially non-existent, wives seek to enforce the mahr agreement as an ordinary
debt that must be paid out of the husbands’ future wealth. In cases where there are
no marital assets, a generous mahr provision may potentially give wives much
more than they would otherwise receive under state divorce laws.
Examining how the courts have dealt with the defenses raised by both
husbands and wives in enforcing the mahr illustrates the struggle to understand the
meaning of these contracts and the need to understand the context in which they
are made.
A. Husbands Invoking the Marriage Contract in American Courts
The most aggressive position that a Muslim husband could adopt in divorce
litigation in an American court would be to claim that by executing the marriage
contract the couple has agreed that the Islamic law of marriage and divorce in its
entirety should govern the marriage.171 In In re Marriage of Shaban, a couple
married in Egypt by executing a traditional marriage contract, which ended with
the words:
The above legal marriage has been concluded in Accordance with his
Almighty God’s Holy Book and the Rules of the Prophet to whom all
171

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting the claim that the execution of an Islamic marriage contract in Egypt
meant that a couple’s divorce should be governed by Islamic law).
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God’s prayers and blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance from the
two contracting parties.172
The husband argued that this language excluded any law but Islamic law from
governing the couple’s California divorce proceeding.173 This was more than
simply a claim that the language represented a choice-of-law clause. Instead of
claiming that the contract was to be construed according to Islamic law, the
husband in effect claimed that the parties had agreed, as a matter of contract, to be
subject to the whole of Islamic family law.174 Obviously, the whole of Islamic law
was not specified in the contract, and therefore would have to be established by
parol evidence.175 Such a contract, the California Court of Appeals concluded,
could not satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires that the essential terms of
agreements made in consideration of marriage be in writing.176
A slightly less aggressive position is for husbands to cite marriage contracts
in support of their efforts to get American courts to recognize the validity of talaq
divorces. When Muslim marriages in the United States break down, a husband
from a country that recognizes the validity of talaq may seek to preempt American
divorce proceedings by traveling to that country or to its consulate or embassy to
perform talaq on his wife.177 The husband will then claim that the American court
must recognize the foreign divorce and that the wife’s claim to any marital
property is limited to what would be available to her in his country of origin.178
While the Constitution requires that states give the judgments of sister states full
faith and credit, American recognition of foreign acts is a matter of comity.179
American courts have uniformly refused to recognize such opportunistic talaqs,
holding that to do so would violate state and federal constitutional provisions of
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Id. at 866.
See id. at 866–67 (outlining the husband’s argument).
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intention by the parties to have the property relations governed by ‘Islamic law,’ which
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party’s separate property.”).
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satisfy the statute of frauds”).
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See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490 (Md. 2008) (husband performed
talaq in the Pakistani embassy); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *1
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See, e.g., Aleem, 947 A.2d at 490 (arguing that on the basis of talaq the wife was
not entitled to distribution of marital property); Tarikonda, 2009 WL 930007, at *2 (same).
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See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 163–203 (1895) (discussing comity and the recognition of foreign
judgments).
173
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equal protection and due process.180 The presence ex ante of a marriage contract
conforming to the requirements of Islamic law has not persuaded them to shift
their analysis.181
Most commonly, husbands have argued that the mahr provisions in their
marriage contracts constitute premarital agreements governing the distribution of
marital property upon divorce. Accordingly, they argue that their wives have no
claim on the marital property beyond the sum specified as the mahr. In at least one
case, this argument has been successful.182 In Chaudry v. Chaudry, the Superior
Court of New Jersey wrote:
[W]e have concluded that the wife is not entitled to equitable distribution
by reason of the antenuptial agreement [i.e. the mahr provision], which
was negotiated on her behalf by her parents. It could have lawfully
provided for giving her an interest in her husband’s property, but it
contained no such provision.183
The court’s analysis in Chaudry, however, is confused. It did not hold that the
contract intentionally bargained away the wife’s rights to equitable distribution of
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See, e.g., Aleem, 947 A.2d at 502 (holding that the recognition of talaq would
violate the Maryland equal rights amendment); Tarikonda, 2009 WL 930007, at *3, *4
(holding that recognition of talaq would violate the wife’s due process rights); Seth v. Seth,
694 S.W.2d 459, 463 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that recognition of talaq would be
contrary to justice).
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See, e.g., Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1978).
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criticism since it was decided. See Ann Laquer Estin, Toward a Multicultural Family Law,
38 FAM. L.Q. 501, 512 (2004) (using Chaudry as an example of a case where the
“husband’s divorce by talaq, made at the Pakistani consulate in New York, could be given
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public policy); David S. Rosettenstein, Comity, Family Finances, Autonomy, and
Transnational Legal Regimes, 23 INT’L. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 192, 194 (2009) (discussing
how a Maryland court distinguished Chaudry and concluded it would violate public policy
to apply Pakistani law to the couple divorcing in Maryland); Tracie Rogalin Siddiqui,
Interpretation of Islamic Marriage Contracts by American Courts, 41 FAM. L.Q. 639, 647,
656 (2007) (citing Chaudry as an example of the harm that arises when courts treat Islamic
marriage contracts as being identical to prenuptial agreements); Edward S. Snyder,
Premarital Agreements Reflect Society’s Changes, 134 N.J. L.J. 919, 919 (1993) (using
Chaudry as an example of a case that lead the legislature to codify an act to deal with
premarital agreements).
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Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1006.
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marital property in the United States.184 Rather, the court rested its holding in part
on a New Jersey conflicts analysis.185
The court reasoned that there was “no reason of public policy that would
justify refusing to interpret and enforce the agreement in accordance with the law
of Pakistan, where it was freely negotiated and the marriage took place.”186 The
problem with this analysis is that, while it is true that under Pakistani law the
wife’s claim on the husband’s assets would be limited to the mahr provision, this
result arose not from the agreement of the parties but from Pakistani property
law.187 In other words, under Pakistani law, the limitation on the wife’s rights arose
not because she bargained those rights away, but from the fact that there was no
marital property under Pakistani law upon which she might have a claim. Hence, in
Chaudry, rather than interpreting the scope of the contract in light of Pakistani law,
the court in effect adopted Pakistani property law as a whole under the guise of
interpreting a contract and applied it to marital property in New Jersey.188
Other American courts have refused to enforce mahr agreements as premarital
contracts bargaining away a wife’s claim on marital property.189 In Ahmad v.
Ahmad, for example, the trial court held that the marriage contract failed to meet
the special formation requirements for premarital agreements.190 According to the
184
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Id. at 1005, 1007.
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Id. at 1006.
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See Rajni K. Sekhri, Aleem v. Aleem: A Divorce from the Proper Comity
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Judgments, 68 MD. L. REV. 662, 672 (2009) (“Under Pakistani law, property follows the
possessor of its title upon divorce. Spouses may inherit property from each other, but
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188
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makes a contract in State A, which the courts of State B determine, as a matter of State B’s
conflicts law, to be governed by the law of State A, it hardly follows that all of Doe’s
property, including property acquired and held in State B, is subject to State A’s property
law simply because State B’s conflicts rules require the application of State A’s law to the
contract Doe made in State A. This is true even if the subject of the Doe’s contract in State
A potentially includes property in State B. In Chaudry, the court in effect held that because
Pakistani contract law should be used to interpret the marriage contract, Pakistani property
law should also govern the treatment of the marital property in New Jersey. As discussed
below, the court fell into this error because it failed to understand the meaning of a mahr
agreement under Islamic law, wrongly concluding that its purpose is to allocate ownership
rights to property acquired after marriage.
189
See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 490 (Md. 2008) (rejecting the claim that
“the performance by him [i.e., the husband] of talaq . . . and the existence of a ‘marriage
contract,’ deprived the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of jurisdiction to litigate the
division of the parties’ marital property situate in this county”); Ahmad v. Ahmad, No. L00-1391, 2001 WL 1518116, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting the husband’s claim
that the mahr provision bars the court from awarding equitable distribution of marital
assets).
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court, the “agreement was unenforceable under Ohio law because at the time the
agreement was entered into, appellee was not represented by counsel, there was no
disclosure of appellant’s assets, and the agreement did not take into consideration
the assets subsequently acquired in Ohio during the eight-year marriage.”191 In
Aleem v. Aleem, rather than declaring that the contract was unenforceable, the trial
court found that it was not a premarital agreement.192 On appeal, the appellate
court suggested that the mahr itself was not marital property and might be
enforceable as an ordinary contract.193 This conclusion was supported by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, which stated “the Pakistani marriage contract in the
instant matter is not to be equated with a premarital or post-marital agreement that
validly relinquished, under Maryland law, rights in marital property.”194
B. Wives Invoking the Marriage Contract in American Courts
Wives have also sued on marriage contracts trying to enforce the husband’s
obligation to pay the deferred mahr. They have adopted two slightly different
strategies. Some women sue on the theory that the mahr provision constituted a
prenuptial agreement setting forth the proper distribution of the marital assets.195
Other women sue on the theory that the mahr provision is an ordinary contract.196
On this view, rather than displacing the state-law property rules regarding the
distribution of marital property, the mahr is a simple debt owed by the husband to
his wife. In cases where there are no marital assets, enforcing the mahr as an
191

Id. at *4 (summarizing the lower court’s holding, with which the appellate court
ultimately agreed).
192
See Aleem, 947 A.2d at 491 (discussing the trial court’s holding).
193
See id. at 502 (“[T]o accept the silence of the ‘contract’ signed by the wife on the
day of her marriage in Pakistan, as a waiver of her rights to marital property acquired
during the marriage, is, in direct conflict with our public policy.”); see also id. at 502 n.16
(“The mahr, deferred in the marriage certificate, would not normally be classified under
Maryland law as marital property in any event, as it may not have been ‘acquired’ during
the marriage.”). While the court suggests that the contract lacked consent on the part of the
wife, it does so in the context of deciding whether to construe the agreement as a prenuptial
waiver of claims to marital property, concluding that the contract should not be construed
in this way. On the other hand, if the wife’s consent to the contract was in fact coerced or
otherwise defective, as the court suggests, this would not keep her from suing on the
contract as duress generally makes a contract voidable rather than void. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by
an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the
contract is voidable by the victim.”).
194
Aleem v. Aleem, 931 A.2d 1123, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
195
See, e.g., Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting
the wife’s claim that the mahr provision ought to be enforced as a prenuptial contract or as
a post-nuptial division of marital property).
196
See, e.g., Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing the
mahr provision under the New York General Obligations Law codifying the ordinary
common law of contracts).
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ordinary contract allows wives to obtain wealth from their ex-husbands even where
they would not be entitled to any property under the ordinary rules of divorce.197
Alternatively, in some cases wives argue that the marriage agreement is an
ordinary contract, and that they are entitled to the deferred mahr payment in
addition to any equitable distribution in the divorce proceeding.198 Husbands have
responded with a variety of defenses.
In those cases where wives sue on the theory that the mahr provision is a
premarital agreement, husbands can argue that the marriage contract failed to
comply with the heightened formation requirements that most states have for
contracts that alter property distributions in divorce. In Zawahiri v. Alwattar, an
Ohio court concluded that a wife could not enforce a mahr provision against her
ex-husband because “the parties entered the marriage contract under circumstances
that rendered the contract invalid and unenforceable.”199 At the time of Zawahiri’s
marriage to Alwattar, he was presented with a pre-printed marriage contract by a
local imam, which contained a blank space for the amount of the deferred mahr.200
At that point Zawahiri and Alwattar’s father both responded that they had not
agreed on a sum for the mahr. After considering the suggestions of various
witnesses, the groom and the bride’s father agreed on a sum of $25,000.201 Under
Ohio law, prenuptial contracts can only be enforced where there is no fraud,
duress, or overreaching, and there is full disclosure of the value of a prospective
spouse’s assets.202 Presumably the court concluded that Zawahiri did not have
adequate information regarding Alwattar’s assets, or else that the last minute
negotiations with her father constituted overreaching or coercion of some kind.203
Husbands have also attacked mahr provisions on public policy grounds. For
instance, for a time California refused to enforce mahr provisions on the theory
that they violated the state’s public policy against contracts that encouraged

197

See, e.g., Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 10, 2008) (“Due to their largely separate lives, the parties did not acquire any
marital property or debts. Therefore, the enforceability of the mahr provision of the
marriage contract became the central controversy of the divorce proceedings.”).
198
See Mir v. Birjandi, No. 2006 CA 63, 2007 WL 4170868, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 21, 2007) (describing a case where the wife claimed rights to property in a divorce
proceeding notwithstanding the husband’s payment of the mahr as the result of a separate
legal action in Iran; the court ultimately used its equitable power in the distribution of the
marital property to adjust the husband’s obligations in light of the mahr payment in Iran).
199
Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *2 (summarizing the trial court’s findings).
200
Id. at *1.
201
Id.
202
See id. at *3 (setting forth the requirements to form a prenuptial agreement under
Ohio law).
203
See id. at *1–2. Because the wife was trying to argue a new theory on appeal—
namely that the mahr provision was an ordinary contract—the published opinion in this
case focuses on issues of waiver rather than revisiting the unreported trial court’s analysis
of the prenuptial argument.
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divorce.204 The court reasoned that because payment was made to the wife upon
divorce, mahr agreements created an incentive for wives to divorce their
husbands.205 The case establishing this precedent, however, was subsequently
overruled by the California courts.206
Husbands may also object that the terms of the mahr agreement are
unconscionable. For example, although the argument was unsuccessful in this case,
in S.I. v. D.P.I, the couple married in Bangladesh with a deferred mahr of 10,000
Lac Taka—approximately $17,000 in American currency.207 When the wife sued
for the mahr during the couple’s subsequent divorce in Delaware, the husband
argued that the contract should be set aside as unconscionable.208 In this case, the
husband’s sisters and the wife’s relatives had arranged the marriage, and on the
day of the marriage the husband was presented with a contract to sign.209 He did
so, insisting that he thought it “had no ‘consequences’ since the agreement is
‘nothing’ in his native country and divorce is rare.”210 He admitted, however, that
he did expect to sign a marriage contract and that the contract would contain a
promise to pay a sum of money to his wife in the event of divorce.211 While the
court did not rule out the possibility that with different evidence a mahr agreement
might be unconscionable, it concluded that the “[h]usband’s testimony essentially
indicates that he believes the contract should not be enforced merely because he
did not expect it to be. This is not adequate.”212
Another defense is to argue that the mahr or sadaq provision is too vague to
be enforced. In cases where the contract specifies a certain and liquidated sum to
be paid upon divorce, such arguments have not been persuasive.213 In Habibi-

204

See In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that prenuptial agreements that facilitate divorce are unenforceable).
205
See id. at 872 (“The contract clearly provided for [the] wife to profit by a divorce,
and it cannot be enforced by a California court.”).
206
See In re Marriage of Bellio, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(noting that Dajani was wrongly decided due to the relatively low amount of the dowry
owed to the wife due upon dissolution of the marriage).
207
No. CN04-091562006, WL 2389260, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2006).
208
See id. at *2 (setting forth the husband’s testimony at trial and on appeal).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at *3. One may speculate at this point that one of the reasons he may have had
this expectation is because in some Muslim countries sometimes wives do not pursue their
mahr rights and other claims against ex-husbands because of fear and/or intimidation. See
Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 220–21 (2002) (discussing the fear and intimidation of a wife
prior to the mahr agreement).
213
See, e.g., Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(enforcing a mahr with a deferred value of $50,000); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (“This Court finds that all of the essential elements of a
contract are present. Thus, this Court rules that the defendant owes to the plaintiff the sum
of $10,000.”).
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Fahnrich v. Fahnrich,214 however, the argument proved successful.215 In that case,
the mahr provision read: “The Sadaq being: a ring advanced and half husband’s
possessions postponed.”216 The court concluded that “[i]n the case at bar, the
material terms of the SADAQ are not specific enough that a person reading it
would be able to grasp the gist of the agreement,” noting that the contract
contained no definition of possessions, no method for determining or measuring
their value, and no indication of when the possessions were to be measured.217
In Akileh v. Elchahal, the vagueness argument took an interesting twist. The
wife instituted the divorce proceedings and asked the court to award her the
$50,000 deferred mahr specified in the couple’s marriage contract.218 The husband
responded by arguing that there was no “meeting of the minds” with respect to the
contract because “he believed that the postponed portion of the sadaq was forfeited
if a wife chose to divorce her husband,”219 while the wife presented expert
testimony that “the wife’s right to receive the sadaq was not negated if the wife
filed for divorce.”220 The court resolved the case in the wife’s favor, characterizing
the husband’s reading of the terms as an undisclosed and idiosyncratic
understanding.221 In such cases, the court reasoned, the ordinary meaning (here the
wife’s interpretation), should control.222
Finally, husbands have argued that the enforcement of mahr provisions would
run afoul of the First Amendment’s prohibition on the establishment of religion
214

No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 10, 1995).
See id. at *3 (holding that a mahr contract was too vague to enforce).
216
Id. at *1.
217
Id. at *2.
218
See Akileh, 666 So. 2d at 247 (describing the course of the litigation).
219
Id. at 248. He went on to testify that he believed that an abused wife who institutes
a divorce was nevertheless entitled to payment of the sadaqa. Id.
220
Id. at 247.
221
See id. at 249 (“At no time did the husband make known his unique understanding
of a sadaq either during his negotiations with his wife’s father or prior to signing the
certificate of marriage.”).
222
See id. While the court’s opinion does not discuss the issue, it is interesting to
speculate on the possible source of the husband’s understanding in the case. He may have
been thinking of the case of a khul’, where the divorce may be dissolved at the wife’s
instigation through mutual consent and by the wife giving up her deferred mahr. See
HALLAQ, supra note 85, at 285–86 (discussing the requirements of khul’). Likewise, his
expressed opinion with regard to the availability of the mahr when a wife institutes a
divorce for cause may be explained by the treatment of the mahr in tafriq, where a qadi
dissolves a marriage for cause most commonly for abuse. See NASIR, supra note 83, at 87–
88 (discussing tafriq’s role in Islamic law countries). Even conservative Muslim jurists in
the United States, however, have argued that because a mahr is the wife’s property upon
marriage, the deferred portion being delayed only because of her forbearance, she cannot
be deprived of the mahr except through her own consent. Even if the filing of divorce is
wrong as a matter of Muslim morality, the wife’s right to the mahr remains absolute. See
NASIR, supra note 83, at 53 (“[T]he dower becomes an exclusive right of the wife under a
valid marriage contract.”).
215
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and its state constitutional analogs.223 These arguments have not been particularly
successful.224 Under the line of United States Supreme Court cases culminating in
Jones v. Wolf,225 courts are generally willing to enforce “religious” contracts so
long as they may do so on the basis of neutral principles of contract law.226
Accordingly, courts have rejected constitutional objections to mahr agreements,
holding that they may make the award by inquiring into the expressed intentions of
the parties without having to pass on questions of religious doctrine.227
IV. MAHR AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: A PROPOSED ANALYSIS
In construing mahr contracts, courts ought to be sensitive to context in
understanding their terms, but I disagree with those who call for the wholesale
invalidation of such contracts on the basis of the wife’s status within Muslim
cultures. At the heart of these criticisms is the belief that the unequal position of
men and women within Islamic culture renders feminine consent to marriage
contracts doubtful.228 Furthermore, they fear that regardless of the question of

223

See, e.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)
(describing the husband’s argument that the mahr contract violated both the First
Amendment and that it was not a valid contract under New Jersey law); Zawahiri v.
Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jul. 10, 2008)
(describing the husband’s argument that the mahr contract violated both the First
Amendment and the Establishment Clause of the Ohio Constitution).
224
But see Zawahiri, 2008 WL 2698679, at *2 (“[T]he trial court refused to enforce
the mahr provision on two grounds: (1) the Establishment Clause of the Ohio Constitution
prohibited court-ordered enforcement of a contractual provision requiring performance of a
religious act, i.e. the payment of the mahr.”).
225
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
226
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1217–19 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the neutral principles line of cases).
227
See, e.g., Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 97 (“Enforcement of this Agreement will not
violate the First Amendment proscriptions on the establishment of a church or the free
exercise of religion in this country.”).
228
See Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 218 (“Treating a mahr provision as a valid
prenuptial agreement that is ‘freely negotiated [when] the marriage took place’ overlooks a
central, sad fact of life for many women in Muslim countries: They often lack true freedom
to contract and bargain for themselves.” (alteration in original) (citing Chaudry v. Chaudry,
388 A.2d 1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978))); cf. Sameer Ahmed, Pluralism in
British Islamic Reasoning: The Problem with Recognizing Islamic Law in the United
Kingdom, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 491, 496 (2008) (“[T]he British government should be wary
of establishing a system in which Islamic family law is legally enforceable by the state.”);
Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1363, 1379 (2007) (“[S]ome religious authorities preclude payment of the mahr to a
wife if she initiates the divorce. Other authorities go further, requiring a wife to waive her
right to alimony before they will grant a divorce. Now, if society defers to religious
authorities, divorce on these terms could impoverish the wife and her child.” (citations
omitted)).
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consent, enforcement of marriage contracts will further entrench inequality within
Muslim communities.229 According to one commentator:
[Muslim women] often lack true freedom to contract and bargain for
themselves. Contracts are built on the presumption that there are two
equally strong parties, freely bargaining for their mutual obligation to
one another. The success of the contract is contingent upon the free
agency of both contracting parties because both parties presumably
bargain in their own best interests. Unfortunately, the current approach
that Islamic family law takes toward women is far more paternalistic,
routinely infantilizing the bride and rendering her virtually, if not
actually, silent.230
The commentator concludes, “mahr agreements contracted in Muslim countries
should be unenforceable because they lack the intent to function as prenuptial
agreements and are frequently too vague or contracted under duress,”231 and
“courts that attempt to enforce American-made mahr agreements must be
especially sensitive to cultural nuances that may affect the validity of the
documents.”232
Such arguments proceed at too high of a level of legal abstraction, attacking
the notion of party autonomy without paying sufficient attention to doctrinal detail
in how these contracts might be analyzed under current law. Commenting on the
controversy surrounding the Ontario Arbitration Act, one scholar noted “there are
costs to isolating and dissociating Islamic law from the ‘informal’ marital web of
rights and duties within which husband and wife love each other, fight, hope, and
play through the use of various strategies.”233 Likewise, there is a danger in
analyzing Islamic marriage contracts independent of the web of doctrines that give
“contract enforcement” its concrete meaning. Armed with an understanding of the

229

See Carol Weisbrod, Universals and Particulars: A Comment on Women’s Human
Rights and Religious Marriage Contracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 77, 90
(2000) (“Nevertheless, contract as an idea raises its own problems. If some clauses are
good for women, then others might be not so desirable. Such clauses might involve the
waiver of rights rather than the expansion of rights.”).
230
Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 218.
231
Id. at 227.
232
Id. at 229. One commentator has argued that such cultural sensitivity is beyond the
constitutional capacity of secular courts. See generally Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic
Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609
(2006). Because Islamic marriage contracts are religious documents, he argues, they cannot
be enforced by secular courts without running afoul of the Establishment clause and
accordingly all litigation on such matters must be referred to Islamic tribunals for
resolution. Id. As discussed below, I regard this conclusion as mistaken.
233
Pascale Fournier, In the (Canadian) Shadow of Islamic Law: Translating Mahr As
a Bargaining Endowment, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 649, 677 (2006).
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terms of mahr contracts and their relation to contract principles, current doctrine
can reach a sensible result in mahr litigation.
A. How Mahr Contracts Should Be Treated under Current Doctrine
1. Mahr Contracts Are Not Prenuptial Agreements
Since the Florida Supreme Court’s celebrated decision in Posner v. Posner,234
the trend has been for courts to discard earlier public policy concerns about
encouraging divorce and to enforce prenuptial agreements. To date, twenty-seven
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) in
order to facilitate such contracts.235 While the UPAA allows parties to contract
regarding “any other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty,”236 the
overwhelming majority of prenuptial agreements concern the distribution of
marital assets upon divorce. Most of these contracts are designed to protect the
assets of a wealthy spouse from the subsequent claims of a poorer spouse.237
According to the UPAA, however, “‘premarital agreement’ means an agreement
between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage and intended to
be effective upon marriage.”238
A mahr contract’s potential status as a prenuptial agreement is important
because if a court deems a mahr as such, then under the UPAA as well as the
common law of some states, defenses unavailable in ordinary contract cases would
become available to defendants. Specifically, in addition to the ordinary
requirements that a contract be voluntarily made and not be unconscionable,
section 6 of the UPAA provides that a party “who was not provided a fair and
reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party,”
and who “did not have . . . an adequate knowledge” of those obligations, may
234

233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
See Myron E. Sildon, Dealing with Divorce and Non-traditional Relationships in
the Family Business, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, July 22–24, 2009, at app. A (“The
UPAA has been adopted by 27 states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.”).
236
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8) (1983). According to the official
commentary this section is designed to make clear “that the parties may also contract with
respect to other matters, including personal rights and obligations . . . . [A]n agreement may
provide for such matters as the choice of abode, the freedom to pursue career opportunities,
the upbringing of children, and so on.” Id. cmt.
237
See Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements in Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229, 234–35 (1994) (discussing the purpose of premarital agreements as
changing the impact of state laws that govern the distribution of property at the end of a
marriage).
238
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1).
235
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avoid liability under the contract.239 Hence, a husband wishing to avoid payment of
a deferred mahr can argue that he should not be held liable because of the bride’s
failure to provide proper disclosure at the time of the marriage, provided that the
court deems the marriage contract to be a premarital agreement.240 Likewise, if a
court concludes that the parties intended by the marriage contract that the wife’s
claim on marital assets was to be limited to the amount of the mahr, she might
raise the husband’s failure to disclose information as a defense.241
But Islamic marriage contracts fit awkwardly into our law of premarital
agreements.242 Reading them against the background of the fiqh that clearly gives
them shape, they are not intended by the parties to be contracts “made in
contemplation of marriage and effective upon marriage.”243 As noted above,244
under Islamic law, marriage is not a ceremony that occurs subsequent to the
marriage contract. Rather, the contract itself is what causes the parties to become
husband and wife. When operating under American law, however, the parties must
necessarily avail themselves of a later civil or religious ceremony. In the eyes of
the fiqh, however, this later ceremony is a mere celebration of what has already
occurred at the moment of signing the contract.245 From the point of view of
Islamic law, the liability for the deferred mahr is not contingent on a subsequent
marriage ceremony. Of course, Islamic law does not control the law of marriage in
the United States, but it is extremely relevant for understanding the intentions of
the parties in entering into Islamic marriage contracts. Read against this context,
parties do not intend for their obligations under these contracts to be “effective
upon marriage.”246
More importantly, parties do not intend for the deferred mahr to be paid in
lieu of a wife’s claim upon marital property or for alimony upon divorce.247 Again,
in understanding the intentions of the parties we should look to the fiqh that gives
rise to the marriage contract. First, under Islamic law there is no such thing as
marital or community property.248 All property belongs to one spouse or the other
and is not subject to equitable distribution on divorce. Accordingly, parties do not
239

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(A)(2)(i)–(iii).
See, e.g., Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jul. 10, 2008) (noting that full disclosure of a prospective spouse’s property is a
required element under Ohio law).
241
As I explain in detail below, it would be a mistake for courts to construe mahr
provisions as agreements to limit a wife’s claim on marital assets.
242
See generally Oman, supra note 21 (discussing the relationship between Islamic
marriage contracts and the specialized law of premarital agreements).
243
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1).
244
See supra notes 80–81, 87–89 and accompanying text.
245
Many classical jurists also insisted that until the marriage was consummated by
sexual intercourse, the marriage contract was voidable without divorce, i.e. tafriq, khul’, or
talaq. See e.g., NASIR, supra note 83, at 52–53.
246
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1).
247
See Oman, supra note 21, at 605.
248
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
240

2011]

HOW TO JUDGE SHARI’A CONTRACTS

323

intend for the mahr to replace a wife’s claim on marital property.249 To impute to
the parties such an intention is to import foreign legal intentions into the Islamic
context. To be sure, a couple that marries in Iran might expect that upon divorce
the wife’s claim on the husband’s wealth will be limited to the mahr.250 This
expectation, however, does not arise from the content of their marriage contract.
Rather, it arises from the fact that Iranian property and divorce law, following the
classical fiqh, does not recognize any analogy to marital or community property.251
Should the couple subsequently divorce in, for example, California, this
expectation will be violently disappointed when the wife is able to prosecute a
successful claim to community property. The disappointed expectations, however,
arise from the fact that the couple is now subject to California property and divorce
law rather than Iranian property and divorce law. In other words, the expectation
is not created by the marriage contract.
Even under Islamic law, the deferred mahr is not a claim (exclusive or
otherwise) of the wife on the property of the husband. Rather, it is a simple debt, a
promise to pay a sum of money upon divorce.252 It is true that the background rules
of Islamic law would limit the wife’s claim on the husband’s wealth upon divorce
to the mahr. The parties, however, did not bargain for this limitation. To hold that
it was part of the contract would be an innovation in contract interpretation. For
example, if two parties enter into a contract in North Carolina they may have
expectations about property rights based on North Carolina law. However, it would
be extremely odd for a court to hold that merely making a contract in North
Carolina means that the whole of North Carolina property law is an implicitly
bargained for term of the contract. Likewise, even if courts use Islamic law to
understand the intentions of the parties, as I discussed above, they should still
confine themselves to construing the bargained for terms of the contract.
Given this analysis, courts should not treat mahr provisions as premarital
agreements. The mahr provisions are not intended to alter the parties’ rights to
property upon divorce.253 Because parties entering into a mahr agreement are not
bargaining away claims to property of uncertain value, it does not make sense to
require special disclosure of assets in order for parties to make informed
decisions.254 Nor are the special concerns regarding bargaining around marriage
present in the case of mahr agreements. The special defenses available in cases
involving premarital agreements are justified, in part, on the grounds that such
249

Id.
See Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles to Human Rights and Possible
Solutions, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 57, 67–68 (1996) (discussing mahr
provisions in Islamic marriages in Iran).
251
See id. at 68–69 (noting the limited property rights of women after divorce in Iran).
252
For example, the husband’s obligation to pay the mahr under Islamic law is not
tied to his wealth. Indeed, the debt continues to exist even if at the time of divorce the
husband has no assets. In Iran, for example, a husband who is unable or unwilling to pay
his wife’s mahr can be imprisoned. Oman, supra note 21, at 591.
253
Id. at 580–81.
254
See id. at 602–03.
250
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agreements are not ordinarily a part of the culture of marriage. Accordingly, they
may be sprung unexpectedly on an unsuspecting prospective spouse on the way to
the altar. In contrast, because under the classical fiqh, a mahr is a formal
requirement of any valid Muslim marriage, it is not sprung on an unsuspecting
prospective husband at the last moment. Given that a mahr is not intended to
replace the state’s default property rules and is an expected part of Islamic
marriage, the justification for the heightened disclosure requirements of the UPAA
do not apply.255
2. Mahr Contracts Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause
In litigation, parties often argue that enforcing mahr contracts would violate
the Establishment Clause.256 According to the argument, because the mahr arises
out of a contract whose meaning comes from the shari’a, a court construing such a
contract would involve making religious determinations that it is constitutionally
prohibited from making. Several courts have accepted this position and it has been
urged by at least one commentator.257 While it is conceivable that construing a
mahr contract could cause the court to involve itself in unconstitutional activity, in
virtually any case that is likely to actually find its way into litigation, there is no
constitutional bar to interpreting and enforcing a mahr agreement.
The United States Supreme Court has never passed on the constitutionality of
enforcing mahr contracts. The most relevant body of case law begins with the
Court’s decision in Watson v. Jones.258 The case involved a schism among
Kentucky Presbyterians over slavery and the Civil War.259 The schism resulted in a
dispute over the ownership of some church property, which ultimately made its
way to the Supreme Court in 1871.260 Although the case did not technically arise
under the First Amendment, Justice Miller declared, “[t]he law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”261 The
Court went on to hold that with regard to the ownership of church property, the
civil law must defer to the decision of the sect’s highest ecclesiastical tribunal
rather than engage in independent interpretation of church doctrine.262 In a
255

See id.
See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text.
257
See Blenkhorn, supra note 92, at 214–18.
258
80 U.S. 679, 735 (1871).
259
See id. at 683–87 (describing the conflict between pro-slavery and abolitionist
sectors within the church, culminating in the marshal taking possession of the church).
260
Id. at 717.
261
Id. at 728. Watson v. Jones was a diversity case that applied the pre-Erie “general
common law.” Id. at 737 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s application
of the general common law was inappropriate because “there were two courts of common
law exercising the same jurisdiction between the same parties in respect to the same
subject-matter, within the same territorial limits, and governed by the same laws”).
262
See id. at 733 (stating that the civil courts do not exercise jurisdiction over
theological matters).
256
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subsequent series of cases involving litigation over church property in the wake of
ecclesiastical disputes, the Court has developed the so-called neutral principles
doctrine.263 As articulated in its most recent extensive discussion of the doctrine,
the Court declared, “the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving
church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.”264 Justice
Blackmun went on to acknowledge, however, that “there may be cases where the
deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates
religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property.”265 In
such cases, he concluded, courts must defer to the interpretations of “the
authoritative ecclesiastical body.”266 The court’s role in resolving such religious
disputes must be limited to the application of neutral, nonreligious principles of
law.267
Transposing this church-centric doctrinal framework to the Islamic context is
difficult. From a Muslim perspective, Islamic law can exist in two senses. First,
there is the strongly religious sense of God’s actual law.268 This is the shari’a in its
purest sense. Human beings may struggle to understand this law in light of God’s
revelation in the Quran, but it is at times necessarily indeterminate from a human
perspective. Human beings are always fallible, and their attempts to specify God’s
commands on the basis of his revelations may be mistaken. Islamic law, however,
also exists as a corpus of scholarly elaboration with a relatively definite shape.
This is law in the sense of fiqh.269 The ultimate goal of the fiqh, of course, is to
discover God’s shari’a, but as a matter of Islamic understanding the fiqh exists as a
social and historical fact. It is not a revelation of God, and determining the fiqh of
this or that school of Islamic jurisprudence is not a matter of interpreting God’s
revelations. It is a matter of determining what learned but human jurists have said.
Indeed, the technical vocabulary of Islam draws a distinction between these two
ways of seeking Islamic law. A person who struggles to discern the will of God
through a direct and unmediated interpretation of revelation engages in ijtihad.270
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In contrast, the person who does not seek to directly discern God’s law, but rather
follows the established fiqh of some school, is engaged in taqlid.271
Transposing these distinctions into American constitutional law, a court that
tried to engage in ijtihad would violate the Establishment Clause. Such a court
would be looking directly to the revelations of Islam in an effort to distill what
God actually commands as the shari’a.272 To use the Christian-derived language in
which the Supreme Court has couched its decisions, a court attempting ijtihad
would necessarily be involved in the “consideration of doctrinal matters.”273 On
the other hand, when a court seeks out Islamic law in the sense of taqlid, merely
applying a particular fiqh rather than presuming to pronounce on the shari’a itself,
it is seeking to answer a concrete historical and social question. It looks to a
particular corpus iuris as a matter of fact, just as a court looking to foreign law
treats the content of that law as a matter of fact.274
When a court is called on to construe the meaning of a mahr provision it
necessarily must look to Islamic law because the intention of the parties is to
include a term in their contract whose public meaning is specified by that law. The
neutral principles doctrine requires that the court resolve questions of meaning
according to neutral principles.275 So long as it is being asked to construe the
meaning of the mahr as a matter of social fact courts do not violate this doctrine,
even if in determining social fact they must look to the fiqh. On the other hand, it
is possible that the parties intended their mahr provision to encapsulate more than
simply the shared public meaning of the term “mahr” as informed by a particular
body of fiqh. Perhaps the parties intend for their obligations to be whatever it is
that God commands when he commands that a mahr be paid as part of a marriage
contract. In this case, the court could not interpret the contract without engaging in
ijtihad and therefore violating the Establishment Clause. Note, however, that the
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Establishment Clause would only be triggered if this very specific intention could
be shown.276
It is extremely unlikely, however, that a court could be called upon to engage
in ijtihad in interpreting an Islamic marriage contract. First, when parties enter
contracts in the context of particular Muslim communities, the most natural
interpretation of their acts is that they have the meaning generally ascribed in the
community to acts of that kind.277 Even if one of the spouses was unusually pious,
and intended for “mahr” to mean what God wants it to mean rather than what it is
generally accepted as meaning in his or her community, this especially devout
intention would not control unless it were known by the other spouse.278 Of course,
if both spouses attached the pious meaning to the term, this would ordinarily
control.279 However, the analysis is further complicated by the fact that mahr
agreements will always be in writing both because they fall within the common
law statute of frauds,280 and because as a matter of Islamic law—and therefore of
Muslim social practice—they must be in writing.281 Accordingly, the parol
evidence rule will apply and the written terms will be given their natural meaning
within their particular context. At this point, parties would only be able to
introduce parol evidence of their especially pious intentions if they were able to
show that the term “mahr” was so vague as to justify such evidence.282 This,
however, will be a difficult case to make in a situation where there is a wellestablished fiqh that gives the term a determinate meaning. In short, both as a
social matter and as a doctrinal matter, it is very unlikely that a court could
properly conclude that a mahr contract required the judge to engage in ijtihad.
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3. Duress and Undue Influence Doctrines Police Overreaching
While fears about the freedom of Muslim women have motivated most of the
critical commentary on the enforcement of mahr provisions, if the court properly
interprets the scope of the contract, the issues of duress and undue influence are
unlikely to come up in litigation. If they do, current doctrine is sufficient to police
the mahr agreement. First, provided the courts reject the misguided attempt to
interpret the mahr as a substitute for a wife’s claim on marital property, husbands
will have little or no incentive to sue on a mahr contract. If it does not displace
state divorce law, then husbands have little to gain by its enforcement. Hence, we
would expect that wives, rather than husbands, would be suing to enforce the mahr
contract, seeking payments in addition to those to which they are entitled under
state divorce laws.
We may suppose that in some cases Muslim women are pressured to marry
and agree to mahr contracts. Current doctrine, however, approaches such cases
with considerable subtlety. A contract made under duress or undue influence is
generally not void but voidable.283 In cases where a wife’s manifestation of consent
is physically coerced—for example if a father was to physically manipulate her
hand into signing a document—then no contract is formed.284 On the other hand, if
a contract “is induced by an improper threat”285 or “unfair persuasion of a
party,”286 then it is valid but voidable at the election of the coerced party. If duress
and undue influence are at issue with Muslim brides, the law will allow them to
use both doctrines as a shield against contractual liability. On the other hand, the
doctrines will not pose a bar to her suing her husband on the contract. He will be
unable to raise her coercion as a defense to his liability.287
283
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The most common situation in which a wife would wish to disclaim a mahr
contract using the doctrines of duress or undue influence would be where a
husband was using it as a sword to cut off her claims under state divorce statutes.
The best response to such an argument, however, is not to invalidate the contract
but rather to point out that when a Muslim couple makes a marriage contract, they
are simply not bargaining over their rights to marital property in divorce. Put in
doctrinal terms, the court should protect the wife via contract interpretation rather
than contract invalidation. Accordingly, only in the rarest of cases should courts be
required to reach the issue of duress or undue influence.
Notwithstanding the stereotype of the domineering Muslim husband, as a
practical matter, questionable circumstances involving a putative wife’s agreement
to a mahr contract are more likely to involve a male relative acting as her wali than
her husband.288 In particular, where marriages are arranged or otherwise represent
a collective family decision rather than an individual romantic one, family
members may place pressure on a woman to consent to a marriage contract. This
pressure can range from the power of social expectations to the threat of economic
abandonment or physical abuse.289 To show duress, a defendant must demonstrate
that she assented to a contract because of an improper threat that leaves her with no
reasonable alternative.290 Physical violence can easily pass the threshold of the
“improper threat” requirement and provided the threatened violence was
immediate, the woman would be left with no reasonable alternatives.291 Threats of
extreme economic pressure have also been held to rise to the level of duress.292 On
the other hand, the mere pressure not to upset social expectations is unlikely to be
sufficient.293
While successfully making a case of duress would be difficult in any but the
most extreme cases, the doctrine of undue influence offers a more promising route
for a woman who wishes to avoid a mahr contract because of pressure from a wali
or other family member.294 Successful cases of undue influence routinely involve
288
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overreaching by family members or other intimates.295 In the case of a mahr
contract, however, a father or other male relative acting as wali is more than
simply a family member. The role of the wali is to look after the interests of the
woman.296 The wali is thus a kind of fiduciary to the putative bride.297 Like the
overreaching family member, the high pressure fiduciary is another common
character in successful cases of undue influence.298 Thus, provided that courts
avoid construing mahr contracts as premarital agreements in which wives bargain
away their rights in divorce, it is unlikely that a wife would wish to challenge the
validity of the contract, and in the unlikely event that she has an incentive to
challenge the mahr provision, the doctrines of undue influence and duress stand
ready to police high pressure tactics by family members.
Finally, while it is important to acknowledge the very real possibility that a
Muslim woman may be subject to undue pressure, it is equally important not to
succumb to the common Western stereotype of all Muslim women as repressed
and powerless. Among immigrant Muslim communities, for example, women
frequently outperform their male counterparts both academically and
economically.299 Hence, while it is true that in many cases a Muslim wife is
economically dependent on her family and her husband, it is also true that Muslim
women are often successful participants in the workplace who have considerable
bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands. For example, the Ohio case of Mir v.
Birjandi300 involved the divorce of an Iranian couple who moved to the United
States. 301 In Iran, the husband had been a successful engineer, but due to his poor
language skills in the United States, he could find work only as a taxi driver.302 In
contrast, his wife enrolled in college in the United States, ultimately earned a PhD
in engineering, and obtained work with a defense contractor.303 At the time of their
divorce, she was earning in excess of $100,000 a year, while her husband’s salary
was less than $20,000 a year.304 Furthermore, the case reveals a wife who was
extremely aggressive and savvy in using Islamic law to her advantage, having her
295
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husband jailed during a visit to Iran for nonpayment of the mahr promised in her
contract.305 Given such realities, it is important that courts avoid the temptation to
stereotype Muslim women.
B. Summary and Evaluation
To summarize the doctrinal analysis put forward thus far, mahr agreements
should not be interpreted as premarital contracts in which the wife bargains away
her rights to marital property and alimony upon divorce. Because the concepts of
marital property and equitable distribution do not exist in Islamic law, it is
unreasonable to suppose that, in traditional marriage, contracts the wife meant to
bargain away nonexistent (from the fiqh point of view) rights. While this means
that divorce proceedings in American courts may unfold in ways very different
than they would under Islamic law, this is not because the courts are refusing to
enforce the contract made by the parties. Rather, any disappointed expectations
arise because American rather than Islamic law provides the default rules upon
divorce.
Contract law does not provide a global guarantee of the parties’ legal
expectations. It merely provides legal recognition of the terms for which they
bargain. Accordingly, the deferred mahr should be treated as a simple promise by
the husband to pay a sum of money to the wife. This promise operates independent
of the property law surrounding divorce. Indeed, given the strict liability of
contract, the husband’s obligation to the wife is legally valid even if he has no
property of any kind.306 Because mahr agreements do not occupy the same social
position as prenuptial agreements—bargaining away rights under state divorce
laws—they should not be treated as prenuptial agreements. Accordingly, courts
should not refuse to enforce these contracts simply because the parties failed to
make full financial disclosures at the time of formation. Even if a court does decide
that the mahr contract should be treated as a prenuptial agreement, the deferred
mahr should still be treated as a personal obligation that does not affect property
distributions or alimony rights. To do otherwise is to import common-law
assumptions into a contract whose meaning is defined by a very different legal
tradition.
Except in the unlikely event that the parties to a contract intend for a court
deciding their case to engage in ijtihad, the enforcement of a mahr agreement does
not violate the Establishment Clause. Courts can decide such cases without making
“theological” determinations, even if in construing the meaning of particular terms
and forms, they must necessarily look to Islamic law for guidance. So long as they
are using fiqh to understand the social meaning of the parties’ actions rather than
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trying to give legal effect to God’s intentions as revealed in the shari’a, they do not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Likewise, concern for the status of women in some Muslim subcultures,
however justified in the abstract, does not justify a blanket refusal to enforce mahr
agreements. If courts correctly construe their meaning, women will have little or
no incentive to attack the validity of the contract. In the unlikely event that they do
wish to attack it, the law of duress and especially undue influence provides a way
for courts to police overreaching by family members.
This proposed treatment of mahr contracts strikes me as quite sensible. It is
sensitive to Muslim sensibilities by treating their religious law with seriousness
and sympathy, seeking to understand the mahr provision on its own terms rather
than through a series of analogies to common-law concepts (prenuptial
agreements) or Christian marriage practices (a contract made before the “real”
marriage, which occurs at the wedding ceremony). To be sure, it will disappoint
those Muslims who believe that their marriage contracts entitle them to have the
entirety of Islamic marital and property law imported into American courts. To
understand deferred mahr contracts in these terms would transform them into super
choice of law clauses that not only specify that Islamic law will govern the
construction of the contract but the entirety of the parties’ property relationships.
Suffice it to say that this is not how the contracts are understood in either the
classical fiqh or in the countries where the fiqh is incorporated into the formally
promulgated family law. Furthermore, by providing the wife with a legally
enforceable right to her mahr, a right that is not contingent on giving up her rights
under state divorce laws, the marriage contract may continue to limit the abuse of
the husband’s power of talaq, which even if it is not recognized by secular law
continues to have important religious—and therefore social—consequences for
Muslim women.
This happy result is reached without dramatically rewriting the common law
of contracts. It looks to the context of the contract, but only for the traditional
purpose of discerning the meaning of the terms that the parties agreed to. As
relational contract theorists have long pointed out, traditional contract doctrine
does not seek to recreate as legal liability the whole of the parties’ complex and
extended relationships.307 Rather it picks out discrete transactions, enforcing
contract terms without regard to the richer social context in which those
obligations operate. It is precisely this transactional approach, however, that allows
307
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traditional contract doctrine to function well in the case of Islamic marriage
contracts. Attempts by husbands to invoke the whole of the classical fiqh’s law of
divorce and property allocation rest on a highly contextual and relational
understanding of contracts. In effect, they insist that one cannot separate the
expectations created by the mahr provision from the totality of expectations
created by the operation of the background legal rules governing property and the
cultural context in which the contract is embedded. Contract doctrine, in contrast,
does not to try to protect the totality of the parties’ relational expectations. Rather,
it protects only those expectations that result from clearly defined agreements.
Other expectations are supported or disappointed by other bodies of law, but this is
not ultimately a set of questions that the contract concerns itself with.
The analysis above likewise avoids the perverse result reached in Chaudry v.
Chaudry,308 where the Superior Court of New Jersey held that in signing a mahr
contract, the wife had bargained away her rights to equitable distribution of marital
property upon divorce.309 This is simply not what parties to Islamic marriage
contracts are bargaining over. Indeed, the main concerns underlying premarital
agreement law do not apply to Islamic marriage contracts. Much of the judicial and
legislative unease about premarital contracts comes from a particular vision of how
they may operate in practice. Lawmakers imagine—not without justification—the
prospective spouse, with a powerful bargaining position, presenting his or her
weaker partner with an agreement on the way to the altar. Presented with a contract
under such circumstances, we worry that prospective spouses will make
inconsiderate or ill-informed decisions out of fear of the social costs and
embarrassment of cancelling or delaying the wedding to engage in contract
negotiations. Likewise, we worry that when prospective spouses negotiate about
the disposition of assets upon divorce they are likely to be unreasonably optimistic
about their chances of connubial success and accordingly, steeply discount the
value of their divorce rights.
None of these concerns make sense in the Islamic context. Part of the
American unease with premarital agreements is that contract negotiation is not part
of the social script that American law inherits from Christianity, particularly late
nineteenth-century Protestantism with its valorization of companionate marriage.
Weddings are supposed to be about tuxedoes, white dresses, walking down the
aisle, throwing rice, and a marriage ceremony in which someone with authority
will pronounce the couple husband and wife. In this tableau, contract negotiation
seems like a jarring intrusion of adversarial, commercial values, an intrusion that
may well take prospective spouses by surprise. In contrast, in the Islamic context,
to become married means that one has made a marriage contract. Far from being
an unexpected intrusion into the process of getting married, the contract lies at the
heart of that process. Furthermore, because a mahr of some sort is a requirement
for a valid marriage contract, it is unlikely that negotiation over the size of the
mahr comes as a surprise to anyone involved in the process. Finally, because the
308
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mahr does not bargain away claims on marital property, the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act’s requirement that prospective spouses disclose the value of their
assets makes little sense. Such a requirement insures that the parties to a traditional
prenuptial agreement understand the value of what they are bargaining over. Such
claims on property, however, simply are not part of what the parties to an Islamic
marriage contract are bargaining over. Accordingly, it makes no sense to allow
husbands and wives to opportunistically invoke the failure to disclose in
subsequent litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The dominant paradigms for thinking about the relationship between law and
religion in American jurisprudence are drawn from the Christian tradition.
Increasingly, however, America is home to Muslim immigrants and citizens. As
they bring their religious practices to American courts, judges will struggle to
understand their meaning and police their possible abuse. Islamic mahr contracts
present perhaps the most common issue of Islamic law and practice with which
American courts have struggled. Islamic marriage contracts should be understood
on their own terms, rather than as an idiosyncratic version of the more familiar
premarital agreement. The move to conceptualize mahr contracts as premarital
agreements ultimately rests on a set of analogies to norms about marriage and
contract that have their origins in a very different religious tradition, namely
Christianity. Treating mahr contracts as premarital agreements is not simply a
misunderstanding; it can also have perverse results. Most seriously, courts may use
the contract to limit a spouse’s claims to equitable distribution of marital assets
when those rights have not been bargained away. Less seriously, parties can
opportunistically invoke the additional formation requirements for premarital
contracts, despite the fact that the concerns that motivate such additional
requirements are not present in the case of Islamic marriage contracts. When courts
sensitively analyze mahr contracts under current doctrine, on the other hand, courts
can reach sensible results that treat Islamic law—and by extension Muslim
citizens—with respect, vindicate the contractual intentions of the parties, and avoid
overreaching and abuse.

